Phenomenology of Intrusive Trauma Memory in Psychosis and its Relationship with Hallucinations and Persecutory Beliefs by Marsh-Picksley, S
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phenomenology of Intrusive Trauma Memory in Psychosis and its 
Relationship with Hallucinations and Persecutory Beliefs 
Sophie Marsh-Picksley 
 
 
 
 
 
D.Clin.Psy. thesis (Volume 1), 2016 
University College London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
UCL Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
Thesis declaration form 
 
 
 
 
I confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has 
been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 
 
 
 
Signature: 
 
 
Name: Sophie Marsh-Picksley 
 
 
 
Date: 15th December 2016  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Overview 
This thesis is presented in three parts, and is focused on developing the theoretical 
understanding of the role of trauma memory in psychosis.  
The systematic literature review investigates the relationship between 
psychosis symptom severity and re-experiencing of traumatic memories. 13 studies 
published since 1980 were identified as meeting the review criteria. Overall, findings 
suggest that people with more severe hallucinations and paranoia experiences report 
more re-experiencing of traumatic memories. However, this relationship was not 
seen when looking at more global symptoms of psychosis. The role of trauma 
memory in the development and maintenance of psychosis therefore warrants further 
investigation.  
The empirical paper (a joint project with Carr (2016), “Developing a brief 
trauma screening tool for use in psychosis”) explores the phenomenology of intrusive 
trauma memory in psychosis and investigates its relationship to hallucinations and 
persecutory beliefs. In line with theoretical accounts (Steel et al, 2005), it was 
hypothesised that increased memory fragmentation would be associated with more 
severe hallucinations.  Twenty participants described an intrusive trauma memory 
and its phenomenological characteristics. Findings indicated that subjective 
fragmentation of intrusive memories was associated with more severe hallucinations 
but not persecutory beliefs, although the relationship between the two ratings of 
objective memory fragmentation and hallucinations were equivocal, with a negative 
correlation for one rating and no relationship for the other. Participants with 
psychosis also reported more frequent and vivid intrusions, with an increased sense 
of reliving, compared to non-clinical sample. The study suggests a potential role for 
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memory fragmentation in hallucinatory experience, although the complexities of 
assessing memory characteristics are highlighted.   
The critical appraisal focuses on the experience of the research process, 
which includes reflections on methodological issues in memory assessment, 
challenges to recruitment in psychosis services and the role of the research process in 
the author’s professional development.  
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Is the severity of re-experiencing trauma memories associated with psychotic 
symptom?  
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Abstract 
Background: Research findings increasingly support a causal role for trauma in 
psychosis (Bentall et al, 2014). Intrusions of traumatic memories have been 
implicated as a potential mechanism accounting for this relationship (Steel et al, 
2005). However, there has been no systematic review of the relationship between re-
experiencing of traumatic memories and psychosis symptoms. This review therefore 
aims to comprehensively examine whether severity of psychosis is associated with 
the severity of re-experiencing traumatic memories.  
Method: Searches of electronic databases PsycINFO, MedLine and Web of 
Science were conducted and 13 studies were identified that met inclusion criteria. 
The quality of this evidence was assessed using a quality appraisal tool developed for 
the purpose of this review. General methodological factors, as well as factors 
pertaining to the measurement of re-experiencing of traumatic memory and 
psychosis, were included. 
Results: There is initial evidence for a relationship between the severity of 
hallucinations and paranoia symptoms of psychosis and re-experiencing severity. 
There is no consistent evidence for a relationship between severity of re-
experiencing, negative symptoms and global symptoms of psychosis in relation to 
both lifetime and psychosis-related traumas. 
Discussion: Findings suggest an association between re-experiencing 
traumatic memories, hallucinations and paranoia.  This relationship may indicate a 
vulnerability relating to impaired contextual integration of sensory-perceptual 
information in psychosis, or that re-experiencing of trauma memories may give rise 
to voices and paranoia.  Further work is required to explore the nature of this 
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relationship and the interactions between traumatic memories and psychosis, and to 
include comprehensive assessments of trauma and related re-experiencing symptoms.     
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1. Introduction 
Evidence increasingly supports a role for trauma in psychosis (Bentall et al, 
2014). Intrusive memories of traumatic events have been implicated as a potential 
causal mechanism in this relationship (Morrison, 2001; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, 
Freeman & Bebbington, 2001; Steel, Fowler & Holmes, 2005).  To investigate this 
hypothesis, this systematic review will examine studies investigating the relationship 
between the severity of psychosis symptom and the severity of re-experiencing 
traumatic memories.  An overview of theoretical accounts of re-experiencingᵃ will 
first be provided. Theoretical frameworks for understanding vulnerabilities in the 
encoding and retrieval of traumatic events in people with psychosis will then be 
outlined. Cognitive models for understanding the relationship between re-
experiencing of traumatic memories and psychosis symptoms will be presented.   
 
1.1 Trauma and psychosis 
It is well established that people with psychosis experience more traumatic 
events compared to the general population, particularly childhood victimisation 
(Grubaugh, Zinzow, Paul, Egede & Frueh, 2011). Trauma in psychosis is associated 
with higher rates of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, poorer functional and clinical 
outcomes, and more severe psychosis (Achim, Maziade, Raymond, Olivier, Mérette, 
& Roy, 2011; Varese et al, 2012). It is therefore important to develop our 
understanding of the relationship between traumatic life events and psychotic 
difficulties.  
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1.2 Re-experiencing of trauma memories in PTSD 
Theoretical models of memory and empirical evidence suggest that encoding 
and retrieval impairment of autobiographical memory is particularly likely to occur 
in response to traumatic experiences. 
Cognitive-behavioural models suggest increased arousal may lead to 
disruptions in memory processing, which give rise to impairment in autobiographical 
memory encoding (Ehlers & Clark, 2000, LeDoux, Iwata, Cicchetti & Reis, 1988, 
Brewin, 2001; Brewin, Lipton, Gregory & Burgess, 2010). An individual’s body and 
brain are evolved to efficiently manage intense distress. When confronted with a 
threat, the information is directly processed by the amygdala, resulting in the quick 
release of stress hormones (LeDoux et al, 1988) and faster, richer processing of 
sensory-perceptual information (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Whilst this has an 
evolutionary advantage, the spatial and temporal context is not as extensively 
encoded, and the conceptual meaning of the events is not elaborated and integrated 
with other life events (Brewin, 2001; Brewin et al, 2010; Layton & Krikorian, 2002). 
This results in the sensory and emotional details of the event being stored in 
increased detail, with impaired encoding of the corresponding spatial-temporal 
context.  
Due to the lack of contextual information during encoding of traumatic events 
(Brewin, 2001; Brewin et al, 2010; Layton & Krikorian, 2002), these memories are 
particularly likely to be triggered by stimuli that represent sensory-perceptual 
matching cues in the environment, and are therefore easily triggered unwanted into 
consciousness. Re-experiencing of traumatic memories are therefore held to result 
from automatic activation of stored sensory memories with a lack of corresponding 
spatial-temporal representations (Brewin, et al, 2010), and are often fragments of 
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experience that are comprised of vivid sensations and perceptions (Bewin & Holmes, 
2003). Thus, re-experiencing of a traumatic memory can include verbal, non-verbal, 
and physiological aspects of memory representations. 
  
1.3 Re-experiencing of traumatic memories in psychosis  
Theorists have highlighted how, in the context of a vulnerability to psychosis, 
people may be more likely to re-experience memories of traumatic events. The 
strength of an individual’s ability to encode spatial and temporal information 
moderates the frequency and nature of intrusions of trauma memory into 
consciousness. People with psychosis are hypothesised as having a weakened ability 
to encode this information (Steel et al, 2005; Hemsley, 1993), possibly due to 
enhanced emotional or stress sensitivity (Fowler et al, 2006; Read, Fosse, Moskowitz 
& Perry, 2014). This weakened contextual encoding ability is more likely to lead to 
decontextualized memories, and is theorised as leading to the subsequent intrusion of 
sensory-perceptual information into consciousness of unintended material from 
autobiographical memory.   
 
1.4 The impact of re-experiencing trauma memories on psychosis 
Cognitive-behavioural models of psychosis suggest that this vulnerability to 
re-experiencing memories of a trauma, is a proximal route for the development of, 
and exacerbates, psychotic symptoms (Morrison, 2003). This is because these 
intrusive memories, which by their nature contain sensory-perceptual information 
and have limited corresponding contextual information, may not be attributed to 
prior trauma. Such intrusions are more likely to lend themselves to ‘culturally 
unacceptable appraisals’, giving rise to hallucinations and delusional beliefs 
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(Morrison, 2001). In support of these models, there is evidence suggesting potential 
specific pathways between childhood trauma, and hallucinations and persecutory 
beliefs (Bentall et al, 2014; Hardy et al, 2016). 
These theoretical accounts propose that people with psychosis may be 
particularly vulnerable to encoding memories in such a way as to increase the 
likelihood of more frequent, vivid and fragmented intrusions, which may manifest as 
hallucinatory experiences or be subject to delusional appraisals.  In investigating the 
relationship between severity of re-experiencing and psychosis, this review will 
therefore consider both global and more specific symptoms dimensions.  
 
1.4 Summary 
Psychosis is associated with increased rates of trauma, particularly childhood 
victimisation and PTSD.  Theoretical models account for how encoding and retrieval 
of traumatic memories are impaired in PTSD, giving rise to intrusive memories or re-
experiencing (Brewin, 2001; Brewin et al, 2010; Layton & Krikorian, 2002; Brewin 
& Holmes, 2003). It has been argued that people with a vulnerability to developing 
psychosis may have an impaired ability to contextualise sensory-perceptual 
information, resulting in them being more likely to experience intrusions following 
trauma, and that such intrusions may lend themselves to culturally unacceptable 
intrusions which manifest as hallucinations and delusional beliefs. To further 
understand the relationship between trauma and psychosis, this review therefore aims 
to comprehensively evaluate the quality and findings of evidence investigating 
whether there is an association between the severity of re-experiencing and 
psychosis.   
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1.5 Research Question 
Is the severity of re-experiencing trauma memories associated with positive, 
negative or global psychotic symptoms, across the continuum of severity?  
 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Search Procedure 
Potential studies were identified via an electronic keyword search of four 
major databases: Web of Science, MEDLINE and PsychINFO. A comprehensive list 
of search terms was developed by reviewing MESH terms for ‘psychosis’ and ‘post-
traumatic stress disorder’. The following search themes were performed: (“Trauma* 
memor*”: OR “Intrusive image**”; OR “Intrusive mental image**”; OR 
“Re?experiencing”; OR “Trauma* intrusion*”; OR “PTSD”; OR “Post?Traumatic 
Stress Disorder”) combined with psychosis related search terms (“Schizo*”; OR 
“Psychotic”; OR “Psychos?s”) using the Boolean operator “AND”. Search terms 
were entered for searching in full article text. Where available on the database, the 
search was limited to peer reviewed journals in the English language in a human 
population of adults (≥18 years). The databases were searched from 1980 to 
November 2016. After database extraction, titles and abstracts were manually 
reviewed to assess whether they met the inclusion criteria. Hand searching for studies 
potentially overlooked or absent from the databases, was performed by screening the 
references of all full text retrieved articles.  
 
2.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Inclusion criteria for peer-reviewed publication was determined with 
reference to the PICO criteria (Sackett, Richardson, Rosenburg & Haynes, 1997). 
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Included studies were required to have an adult population (≥18 years) with an 
experience of psychosis in both clinical and non-clinical samples, measured with a 
symptom assessment. Studies were excluded if there was an organic or neurological 
cause of psychosis, primary diagnosis of PTSD, or primary diagnosis of substance 
use. Studies were required to have reported a behavioural measure of re-experiencing 
of traumatic memory. Only studies which looked at the relationship between these 
symptom measures were included. Studies were only included when published in a 
peer-review journal in the English language. PTSD was introduced as a diagnostic 
category in the DSM in 1980, leading to the development of measures reflecting re-
experiencing. Therefore, only articles published between 1980 and November 2016 
were included. Articles were excluded if poster or conference abstracts were 
identified without an available corresponding published article, and if they were of a 
single case study design or reported only qualitative analysis.  
 
2.3 Selection of Studies 
See Figure One for a PRISMA flow diagram of the study selection process. 
The initial search produced a total of 1,462 articles, after duplicates were excluded. 
The titles and abstracts of the 1,462 papers were manually reviewed to determine 
which were eligible for inclusion. In cases of uncertainty over the inclusion of a 
specific article, the methodology and results sections were also reviewed. 68 articles 
were selected for full text review and screening to assess eligibility. Article reference 
lists were then reviewed for additional studies; no articles were identified. From the 
screening, 13 publications were selected for inclusion in the review.  
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2.4 Quality Assessment  
There is a lack of consensus in the literature regarding the methodological 
review of cross-sectional studies (Katrak, Bialocerkowski, Massy-Westropp, Kumar, 
& Grimmer, 2004). This review therefore developed a quality assessment tool to 
assess the methodological factors which may have impacted on the reliability and 
validity of the study findings. These are detailed in Table One.       
2,224 of records identified through 
database searching 
 
PsychINFO (n=735)  
MEDLINE (n=501) 
Web of Science (n=988) 
 69 of full text articles 
assessed for eligibility 
1,391 of records excluded based on title and 
abstract. Papers excluded based on: 
 Not an adult population 
 Comorbid drug use primary diagnosis  
 Primary diagnosis not psychosis  
 Theoretical papers 
 Duplicated data 
 Single case design 
 Qualitative data only  
 
 
 
 
 
1,459 of records after duplicates (n=765) removed. 
 
Sc
re
en
in
g 
56 full-text articles excluded. 
Primary reason for exclusion*:  
No negative memories (n=2) 
Population (n=4) 
PTSD symptoms recorded but no re-
experiencing data reported (n=24) 
Analysis not separated by diagnosis (n=7) 
No relationship (n=17) 
Voluntary retrieval (n=1)  
Analogue trauma (n=1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,459 of records 
screened 
  
Id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
  
In
cl
u
d
ed
 
El
ig
ib
ili
ty
  
 
 13 studies included in 
systematic review  
Figure 1. Flow diagram of electronic search strategy 
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Table 1. Quality Assessment Appraisal Tool 
 
- Should be reserved for those aspects of the study in which significant sources of bias may persist 
+ Indicates that either the answer to the checklist question is not clear from the way the study is reported, or that the study may not have addressed all potential sources of bias 
for that particular aspect of study design 
++ Indicates that for that particular aspect of the study design, the study has been designed or conducted in such a way as to minimise the risk of bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Selection of subjects  Trauma Exposure 
Assessment 
Analysis  Psychosis Measure Measure of Re-experiencing  
 
Overall Quality 
 
- 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
++ 
 
 
Poorly described  Only trauma of a 
specific nature assessed  
Analysis of the 
relationship between 
re-experiencing and 
global symptom 
severity. 
Measure developed for use 
in the study, limited 
validation 
Re-experiencing measured in 
relation to one index trauma. 
Few or no checklist criteria 
have been fulfilled and the 
conclusions are likely or very 
likely to alter 
Adequately described,  
however, small sample 
size.  
All trauma 
comprehensively 
assessed using an 
unvalidated measure  
Analysis of the 
relationship between 
re-experiencing and 
global, positive and 
negative symptom 
severity.  
Standardised self-report 
questionnaire  
Comprehensive assessment 
of re-experiencing, 
unanchored to one index 
trauma, using a standardised 
self-report questionnaire  
Some of the checklist criteria 
have been fulfilled, where they 
have not been fulfilled, or not 
adequately described, the 
conclusions are unlikely to alter 
Representative of 
population, indicated % 
participation sample 
well described, 
inclusion criteria made 
explicit 
All trauma 
comprehensively 
assessed using a 
standardised measure  
Analysis of the 
relationship between 
re-experiencing and  
specific symptoms of 
psychosis.   
Standardised diagnostic or 
interview measure 
Comprehensive assessment 
of re-experiencing, 
unanchored to one index 
trauma, using clinician 
administered standardised 
assessment tools 
All or most of the checklist 
criteria have been fulfilled, 
where they have not been 
fulfilled, the conclusions are 
very unlikely to alter 
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Deciding which quality criteria to include in this tool was achieved by 
drawing on research in the following areas: psychosis assessments; assessment of re-
experiencing of traumatic memories, and general methodological assessment quality. 
Quality factors identified in these areas were discussed and considered for inclusion 
by the author and supervisors.  
As an outcome of this process, five factors were identified. The NICE rating 
system for methodological quality of studies was employed for rating these factors 
(NICE, 2007). The NICE rating system rates the studies from good quality (when all 
or most of the criteria have been fulfilled) (++), to reasonable quality (when some of 
the criteria have been fulfilled) (+) to poor quality (when few or no criteria are 
fulfilled (−)). A total quality score was derived from summing the quality assessment 
variables and a corresponding quality rating of low (3-5), medium (6-7) and high (8-
10) were given to the studies. The quality assessment tool was developed in 
collaboration with the research supervisors, piloted on four of the included articles, 
and then refined. These factors are listed below: 
1. Selection of subjects: contained two separate measures of quality, (i) the richness 
of the description of the sample and (ii) sample size. Studies with larger samples 
with more detailed descriptions of the subjects were given higher quality ratings. 
Poorly described samples were rated lowest.   
2. Psychosis measure: Gold standard diagnostic interviews were allocated the 
highest quality score, while those using an un-validated self-report questionnaire 
were rated as lowest quality.  
3. Trauma Exposure Assessment: Studies in which all traumas were 
comprehensively assessed using a standardised measure were rated as highest 
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quality. Those with only trauma of a specific nature assessed were given the 
lowest rating.   
4. Measure of re-experiencing: Those studies which undertook a comprehensive 
assessment of re-experiencing, which were unanchored to one index trauma using 
gold standard PTSD diagnosis tools, were given a higher quality rating than a 
self-report questionnaire investigating the same constructs. Re-experiencing 
measured in relation to one index trauma was given the lowest rating. 
5. Analysis: Studies in which the relationship was measured between re-
experiencing of traumatic memories and specific symptoms of psychosis, were 
set as the highest quality.  Studies which only investigated the relationship with 
global symptoms of psychosis were given a lower quality rating.  
 
3. Results 
Thirteen studies investigating the relationship between psychosis symptom 
severity and re-experiencing of traumatic memories are summarized in Table Two. 
 
3.1 Summary of studies 
Nine studies included a clinical sample of people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia or first episode psychosis. Three studies had a general population 
sample (Kocsis-Bogar, Miklosi, & Perczel-Forintos, 2013; Holmes & Steel, 2004; 
Gracie et al, 2007; Alsawy, Wood, Taylor, & Morrison, 2015) and one study 
recruited participants attending a trauma service (Marzillier & Steel, 2007). Studies 
looked at the relationship between psychosis symptom severity and re-experiencing 
of different trauma types. Six studies investigated re-experiencing of traumatic 
memories related to their psychosis illness, five studies investigated this relationship 
in regards to lifetime traumas and two studies measured re-experiencing in relation to 
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childhood trauma.  All studies included both male and female participants, with a 
roughly equal weighting by gender. Sample size ranged from n = 13 to n = 7403. 
Overall n = 8,300 participants were involved in the studies. The mean age ranged 
between 20 – 44 years.  
 2
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Table 2.  Detailed overview of the studies included in this review 
Author Clinical Group Trauma Type Study Aims Measure of Re-
experiencing 
Measure 
of 
Psychosis  
Statistical 
Analysis 
Mean re-experiencing 
and psychosis 
symptom ratings (SD) 
Relevant Findings 
Clinical Sample 
Jackson et 
al, 2004  
N=35. FEP 
Total sample 
Female N=9, 
Age M=25.8 
(5.09) 
 
 
PR-PTSD 
First episode of 
psychosis 
To evaluate the 
diagnostic status of first 
episode psychosis as a 
PTSD-triggering event 
and to determine the 
extent to which 
cognitive factors can 
mediate the expression 
of PTSD 
symptomatology 
IES 
 
PANSS 
KGV 
 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
Re-experiencing: M=12.7 
(8.8).  
 
Psychosis: Not reported 
There was not a significant 
relationship between re-
experiencing and residual psychotic 
symptoms. While psychotic 
symptoms were in remission for 
much of the sample, there was no 
significant relationship between 
hallucinations and delusions and re-
experiencing (hallucinations r=0.23; 
p=0.18; delusions r=0.20; p=0.25).  
Harrison & 
Fowler, 
2004 
 
N=38 
Schizophrenia 
Female=8. Age 
M=36.5 (11.1) 
PR-PTSD 
Specifically ask people 
to think about their 
psychotic symptoms 
and experience of 
hospitalisation 
To examine the 
association between 
negative symptoms, 
autobiographical 
memory and traumatic 
reactions to psychosis 
and hospitalisation.  
IES-R subscale 
 
 
PANSS Spearman’s 
Correlation  
Re-experiencing: 
Psychosis M=4.11 (4.42) 
and Hospitalisation 
M=1.55 (2.39).  
 
Psychosis: Positive 
M=12.61 (5.58), negative 
M=13.74 (7.05) 
There was a significant positive 
relationship between re-
experiencing of hospitalisation and 
negative symptom severity (r=0.48, 
p<0.05). There was no significant 
relationship between re-
experiencing of hospitalisation and 
positive symptom severity (r=0.20, 
p=N.S), re-experiencing of psychosis 
and negative symptom severity 
(r=0.08, p=N.S) and re-experiencing 
of psychosis and positive symptom 
severity (r=0.15, p=N.S).   
White & 
Gumley, 
2009 
N=27 
Schizophrenia 
Female N=7 Age 
M = 38.5 (SD 
10.7).  
PR-PTSD 
Specifically asked 
people to think about 
traumas related to their 
illness 
To investigate if PP-
PTSD is associated with 
fear of recurrence, 
negative idiosyncratic 
appraisals of 
psychotic experiences, 
and intolerance of 
CAPS-S  
 
 
PANSS Pearson’s 
Correlation 
No PTSD diagnosis 
Re-experiencing: M=4.2 
(5.6). 
 
Psychosis: Positive 
M=11.4 (2.5), negative 
M=10.0 (3.7), total 
There was a significant positive 
relationship between re-
experiencing and negative 
symptom (r=0.42, P<0.05) and total 
symptom severity (r=0.50, p<0.01). 
The relationship was not significant 
with positive symptoms (r=0.27, 
 2
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uncertainty. M=48.0 (6.3) 
 
PTSD diagnosis 
Re-experiencing M=19.0 
(7.53). 
 
Psychosis: Positive 
M=13.8 (3.7), negative 
M=14.7 (5.3), total 
M=62.3 (13.4).  
p=NS 
Tarrier et 
al, 2007 
N=35 FEP. 
Female N=10 
Age M=24.9 (SD 
6.3). 
 
 
PR-PTSD 
Specifically asked 
people to think about 
traumas related to their 
hospitalisation or 
treatment of their 
illness. 
To assess the subjective 
effect and 
consequences of 
suffering a first episode 
psychosis. 
CAPS modified 
for use with 
patients with 
psychotic illness 
 
 
PANSS Type of 
analysis not 
reported 
Re-experiencing: Not 
reported 
 
Psychosis: Not reported 
There was no significant 
relationship between re-
experiencing and positive, negative 
or general psychotic symptoms. 
Inferential statistics not reported.  
Priebe et al, 
1998 
N=105 
schizophrenia 
Female 44.8% 
Age M=38.6 (SD 
9.4) 
PR-PTSD 
The traumatic events 
were either an 
involuntary admission 
or if not present 
negative aspect of 
treatment asked as part 
of the PTSD 
standardised interview 
To investigate the 
association between 
involuntary admissions 
and PTSD symptoms, 
and the correlation 
between PTSD 
symptoms and 
psychopathology. 
PTSD Interview 
 
BPRS 
PSE 
Pearson’s 
correlations 
Re-experiencing of 
involuntary admission:  
M=8.1 (5.2) 
 
Psychosis: (BPRS) M=32.0 
(8.6), (PSE) M=22.2 (14.1) 
There was a significant positive 
relationship between re-
experiencing and anxiety / 
depression on the BPRS (r=.33 
p<0.01). There were no significant 
relationships between experiencing 
and BPRS Total, BPRS Activation, 
BPRS Thought disturbance, BPRS 
Hostility and suspiciousness and 
PSE Delusions and hallucinations. 
Shaw et al, 
2002 
N = 42  
Schizophrenia 
spectrum 
Female N=16 
Age M =29.8 
(SD 10.86)  
 
PR-PTSD 
IES score was in relation 
to experience of 
psychosis and 
treatment. 
 
To examine the 
contribution of 
treatment and illness 
factors as well as 
previous trauma in the 
development of 
PP/PTSD 
IES 
 
CIDI  
FCRS  
 
Pearson’s 
correlations 
Re-experiencing: 
M=33.91 (17.80) 
 
Psychosis: Not reported 
There was a positive relationship 
between re-experiencing and 
psychosis severity (FCRS r=.31, 
p<0.05). There was no relationship 
with total number of schizophrenia 
symptoms (CIDI) (r=.15, NS)  
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Resnick et 
al, 2003 
N=47 
Schizophrenia 
Female N=30 
Age M=44.1 (SD 
9.7)  
Lifetime 
Trauma History 
Questionnaire-R 
 
To evaluate the 
hypothesis that trauma 
and PTSD severity 
would be positively 
associated with 
schizophrenia 
symptoms 
CAPS subscale 
 
PANSS Pearson’s 
Correlations 
Re-experiencing: no 
criterion A trauma 
M=1.81 (3.19), adult 
trauma M=2.19 (3.49), 
child and adult trauma 
M=10.44 (7.23) 
 
Psychosis: Total M=2.2 
(0.5), positive M=2.4 
(1.2),negative M=2.1 (0.9) 
There was no significant 
relationship between re-
experiencing and total PANSS 
(r=.06) positive symptoms (r=.18) 
and negative symptoms (r=-.14). 
Bendall et 
al, 2013 
N=13 FEP with 
CSA. Female 
N=54%, Age  
M=20.62 (SD, 
3.10) 
Lifetime 
Childhood Trauma 
Questionnaire 
To test theories of the 
relationship between 
CSA, hallucinations and 
delusions, 
posttraumatic 
intrusions, and selective 
attention in FEP. 
IES-R 
 
PANSS Pearson’s 
correlation 
Re-experiencing M=1.84 
(1.38).  
 
Psychosis: positive 
Symptoms M=21.46 
(4.96), negative 
symptoms M=19.31 
(2.21) 
There was a positive relationship 
between re-experiencing and 
combined delusions items (r=0.47, 
p=0.05), this relationship was at 
trend level with hallucinations 
(r=0.44, p=0.06).  
Schafer et 
al, 2011 
N=38 FEP 
Female=60% 
female. Age 
M=31  
 
 
Lifetime 
The Childhood 
experience of Care 
Abuse Questionnaire 
To examine the internal 
reliability and 
comparability of the IES 
in a sample of people 
with FEP and controls 
exposed to severe 
physical/sexual abuse. 
IES SCAN Spearman’s 
Correlation 
Re-experiencing M=6 
(8.3).  
 
Psychosis: Not reported 
There was a significant negative 
relationship between re-
experiencing and reality distortion 
(rs=-0.362, p=.046). There was no 
relationship between re-
experiencing and negative 
symptoms (rs= 0.085, p=0.753)   
Non-Clinical Sample 
Kocsis-
Bogar et al, 
2013  
N=198. Age 
M=20.47 (1.95) 
Undergraduate 
students 
Lifetime 
Paykel’s Life Events 
scale (short Version) 
Whether schizotypy has 
a relationship with 
vulnerability to 
traumatic intrusions 
IES 
 
 
O-LIFE Pearson’s 
Correlations 
Re-experiencing M=8.02 
(5.84).  
 
Psychosis: Unusual 
experiences M=9.21 
(5.15), introvertive 
anhedonia M=5.28 (3.68), 
total M=31.32 (12.30). 
There were positive relationships 
between intrusions and positive 
symptoms (r=0.282 p<0.001), 
intrusions and negative symptoms 
(r=0.143, p<0.05) and intrusions 
and total (r=0.348, p<0.001).  
 2
5
 
Footnote: 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); First episode psychosis (FEP); Post-psychotic post-traumatic stress disorder (PP-PTSD); Childhood sexual abuse (CSA) 
 
Marzillier & 
Steel, 2007  
N=50, female 
N=27. Age 
M=38.1. 
Trauma service 
waiting list  
Lifetime 
Index trauma taken 
from referral to service. 
No routine trauma 
measure used. 
To investigate 
schizotypy as a 
vulnerability factor for 
trauma-related 
intrusions through the 
use of a clinical sample. 
PDS   STA 
 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
Re-experiencing: 
M=32.76 (12.35)  
 
Psychosis: M=20.43 (7.86) 
There is a positive relationship 
between total and re-experiencing 
(r=0.34 p<0.05) and magical 
thinking and re-experiencing 
(r=0.50 p<0.01). There was no 
significant relationship between 
unusual perceptual experiences and 
re-experiencing (r= 0.22, p=NS) and 
paranoid suspiciousness and re-
experiencing (r=0.23, p=NS) 
Gracie et al, 
2007  
N=228 Female 
N=161. Non-
clinical 
population. Age 
M=328.9 (8.7) 
Lifetime 
Traumatic Life Events 
Questionnaire + 2 items 
from The Childhood 
Trauma Questionnaire 
 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
trauma and 
predisposition to 
hallucinations and to 
paranoia in a non-
clinical sample. 
SRS-PTSD  PS 
LSHS  
 
Bivariate 
Pearson’s 
Correlation 
Re-experiencing M=1.7 
(1.5) 
 
Psychosis: Paranoia scale 
M=41.7 (14.9). Launay 
Slade Hallucination Scale 
M=2.7 (2.2).  
There is a positive relationship 
between re-experiencing and 
paranoia (r²=0.31 p<0.001) and 
hallucinations (r²=0.26, p<0.001). 
However, while significant, the 
amount of variability explained by 
re-experiencing alone was small 
sr²=0.03 (3%).  
Alsawy et 
al, 2015 
N=7403 Female 
N=4206. Age 
16-75+ 
Adult 
Psychiatric 
Morbidity 
survey  
Lifetime 
One question asked 
about trauma from 
SCID. Limited to over 16 
years 
To examine the 
relationship between 
symptoms of PTSD with 
paranoia and auditory 
hallucinations 
TSQ 
 
PSQ  Pearson’s 
correlation 
and 
logistical 
regression 
Re-experiencing: Not 
reported 
 
Psychosis: Not reported 
There was a positive relationship 
between re-experiencing and 
paranoia and auditory 
hallucinations (p<0.005). The odds 
of experiencing paranoia and 
hallucinations increase with greater 
numbers of re-experiencing 
symptoms with a dose dependent 
relationship. Hallucination: 3 
reliving symptoms OR=4.98 CI 
(1.49-16.61) p<0.05. 4 reliving 
symptoms OR 14.05 CI (6.67-29.47). 
p<0.05. Paranoia:  3 reliving 
symptoms OR=4.33 CI (2.05-9.18) 
p<0.05. 4 reliving symptoms OR 
4.36 CI (1.88-10.10). p<0.05.  
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Psychosis:  
Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS) Kay et al., 1987; Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) Overall & Gorham, 1962; Schizotypal Personality Scale (STA) Claridge & Broks, 1984; 
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE) Mason et al., 1995; The Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN) World Health Organization, 1992a; 
Factor Construct Rating Scale (FCRS) Overall, 1986;  The Paranoia Scale (PS) Fenigstein A, Vanable PA. 1992; The Launay Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS) Launay G, Slade P 1981; 
Psychosis Screening Questionnaire (PSQ) Bebbington & Nayani, 1995; Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) World Health Organization, 1990; The Psychiatric Assessment 
Scale (KGV) Krawiecka, Goldberg & Vaughan, 1977.  
 
Re-experiencing: 
Impact of Event Scale (IES) Weiss & Marmar, 1997; Impact of Event Scale- Revised (IES-R) Weiss, 2007; Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) Blake et al., 1990; Post-traumatic 
Diagnostic Scale (PDS) Foa, Cashman, Jaycox & Perry, 1997).The Self-Report Scale-Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (SRS-PTSD) Carlier I, Lamberts R, Van Uchelen A 1998; Trauma 
Screening Questionnaire (TSQ) Brewin et al 2002; Trauma Memory Questionnaire (TMQ) Halligan et al. 2003; Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) Foa, 1995 
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3.2 Overview of Quality Ratings 
The quality assessment of the studies (Table Three) indicated that while there 
was a range in the quality of the studies, the majority of the studies were rated low 
quality. For example, only four studies scored a medium quality rating (6 - 7 out of a 
possible 10). A high quality rating was not achieved by any of the studies. The main 
weakness across the studies was that they did not systematically assess re-
experiencing in relation to the total range of people’s traumatic experiences, but 
rather re-experiencing was anchored to one index trauma. Additionally, studies of 
lowest quality also did not assess trauma comprehensively. In general, studies of 
medium quality investigated the relationship between re-experiencing and specific 
symptoms of psychosis, while those of lower quality looked at this relationship only 
in relation to global symptoms of psychosis.  
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Table 3. Quality Assessment of Included Papers 
Author Selection of 
Subjects 
Psychosis 
Measure 
Re-experiencing 
Measure 
Analysis Trauma 
Assessment 
Overall Quality 
Score 
Overall Quality 
Rating  
Resnick et al, 2003 ++ ++ - + ++ 7 Medium 
Jackson et al, 2004  ++ ++ - ++ - 6 Medium 
Gracie et al, 2007 ++ + - ++ ++ 7 Medium 
Kocsis-Bogar et a, 2013  ++ + - + ++ 6 Medium 
Harrison & Fowler, 2004  ++ ++ - + - 5 Low 
White & Gumley, 2009  + ++ - + - 4 Low 
Tarrier et al, 2007 ++ ++ - + - 5 Low 
Shaw et al, 2002  ++ ++ - - - 4 Low 
Bendall et al, 2013  + ++ - ++ - 5 Low 
Schafer et al, 2011  + ++ - + - 4 Low 
Priebe et al, 1998 ++ + - + - 4 Low 
Alsawy et al, 2015 ++ + - ++ - 5 Low 
Marzillier & Steel, 2007 ++ + - - - 3 Low 
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3.2.1 Trauma Assessment  
Six studies did not comprehensively assess trauma experience, as people were 
only asked about traumatic experiences in relation to their psychosis illness (Jackson 
et al, 2004; Harrison & Fowler, 2004; White & Gumley, 2009; Tarrier et al, 2007; 
Priebe et al, 1998; Shaw et al, 2002). Three studies more comprehensively assessed 
lifetime trauma experiences using standardised measures. Resnick et al (2003), 
assessed trauma with the Trauma History Questionnaire, Kocsis-Bogar et al (2013), 
assessed trauma with the Paykel’s Life Events scale and Gracie et al (2007) used the 
Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire and two items from The Childhood Trauma 
Questionnaire, notably those assessing exposure to neglect, bullying and emotional 
and physical abuse. The Trauma History Questionnaire is a self-report measure of 
both the frequency and age of a range of potentially traumatic events.  The Paykel’s 
Life Events Scale is also a self-report measure which asks about a range of traumatic 
events. However, in addition, respondents are asked for any further events missing 
from the list that they experienced and found stressful. While not asking about the 
frequency and age at which the event occurred, this measure asks for a binary 
response of experience and the subjective severity of the event. The Traumatic Life 
Events Questionnaire also asks for a binary response to exposure to a range of 
potentially traumatic events, and additionally investigates intense fear, helplessness 
or horror which was experienced if the event occurred.  
Two studies assessed trauma experience using standardised measures, 
restricted to experiences occurring during childhood. Bendall et al, (2013) assessed 
childhood trauma using the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire and Schafer et al, 
(2011) used the Childhood Experience of Care Abuse Questionnaire. The Childhood 
Trauma Questionnaire screens for histories of five types of maltreatment; emotional, 
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physical and sexual abuse, and emotional and physical neglect in childhood, and it 
asks for responses to each question on a 5-point Likert Scale, ranging from never true 
to very often true. The Childhood Experience of Care Abuse Questionnaire assessed 
lack of parental care (neglect and antipathy), and both sexual and physical abuse, and 
defines childhood up to the age of 17 years. 
Alsawy et al (2015) asked about people’s experience of trauma, based on 
questions constituting the SCID, and limited this to experience over the age of 16, 
while one study undertook no assessment of trauma, measuring only the index 
trauma taken from referral to a trauma service (Marzillier & Steel, 2007).  
 
3.2.2. Assessment of re-experiencing of traumatic memory  
There was a wide range of measures for assessing re-experiencing of 
traumatic memories. The most common were self-report questionnaires for PTSD, 
with clinical interviews for PTSD also being used, and other studies using 
observational diary methods.  
Self-report questionnaires are the most frequently used in the studies, 
however, their properties vary over the time periods people are asked to report their 
experience of symptoms, and if the presence, frequency or severity of symptoms are 
measures. The most frequent assessment was the Impact of Event Scale (IES) used 
by four studies (Schafer et al, 2011; Shaw et al, 2002; Kocsis-Bogar et al, 2013; 
Jackson et al, 2009), with two studies using the revised version of the scale (Harrison 
& Fowler, 2004; Bendall et al, 2013). The Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz, Wilner 
& Alvarez, 1979) is a self-report questionnaire that assesses frequency of avoidance 
and intrusion commonly experienced in PTSD after a traumatic event. The revised 
scale contains seven additional items related to the hyperarousal symptoms of PTSD 
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(Weiss and Marmar, 1996). Other less commonly used self-report measures was the 
Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) which was used by one study (Marzillier & 
Steel, 2007). This scale assessed both the frequency and associated distress of PTSD 
symptoms over the past month (Foa, Cashman. Jaycox, & Perry, 1997), whereas the 
IES enquired about symptoms over the past week. The Self-Report Scale-Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (SRS-PTSD) was the measure used by one study (Gracie 
et al, 2007), which also measured both the presence and severity of PTSD symptoms. 
The Trauma Screening Questionnaire (TSQ) (Brewin, 2002), used in one study 
(Alsawy et al, 2015) assessed frequency of symptoms, with the experience having to 
have occurred twice in the past week to be endorsed.  
Clinician-administered clinical interviews were less frequently used by 
studies included in this review. The gold standard in PTSD assessment, Clinician 
Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) was used by one study (Resnick et al, 2003) with 
two studies (White & Gumley, 2009; Tarrier et al, 2007) using modified versions of 
the interview for use with people with schizophrenia (Gearson, 2004). The CAPS 
(Blake et al, 1995) is a structured interview designed to make a PTSD diagnosis, as 
well as measuring both frequency and intensity of symptoms. The PTSD Interview 
(PTSD-I) was also used in one study (Priebe et al, 1998). In this interview, the 
presence and frequency of symptom is measured (Watson, Juba, Manifold, Kucala & 
Anderson, 1991). 
 
3.2.3 Assessment of psychosis  
A wide range of measures of psychosis were employed, both those using 
clinician interviews, and those using self-report measures. Furthermore, some 
measures are developed for diagnostic purpose in a psychosis population, while 
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others look at the continuum of subclinical features of psychosis.  This highlights the 
wide variety in the symptomatology, quality and scope of the measures used in 
studies included in this review.   
A number of clinician administered assessment scales were used. The most 
commonly used measure was the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) 
which was used by five studies (Harrison & Fowler, 2004; White & Gumley, 2009; 
Resnick et al, 2003; Bendall et al, 2013; Tarrier et al, 2007). The PANSS is used to 
assess the severity and quality of psychotic symptoms (Kay et al, 1987), and draws 
on both a clinical interview as well as family member’s reports. Less frequently used 
measures of psychosis were the Composite International Diagnostic Instrument 
(CIDI) (WHO, 1993) and Factor Construct Rating Scale (FCRS) (Overall, 1968) 
used in Shaw et al (2002) study. Both are clinician based interviews. The CIDI is 
based on the World Health Organization's Composite International Diagnostic 
Interview (WHO, 1990) and measures the prevalence of mental disorders and 
severity of these disorders, while the FCRS scale focuses only on the severity of 
psychotic symptomatology. Jackson et al (2004) study used the Psychiatric 
Assessment Scale (PAS) (Krawiecka, et al, 1977), which is a semi-structured format 
to elicit information from the patient, and includes observations of their behaviour in 
the interview about positive, negative and affective symptoms, while limiting this to 
the preceding month. Priebe et al (1998) asked participants to complete the Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale: (BPRS; Overall & Gorham, 1962). While this scale also 
assesses the positive, negative, and affective symptoms of individuals using a clinical 
interview, it takes into account observations of the patients for a longer time-period 
than the PAS (2-3days). Schafer et al (2011), asked participants to complete the 
Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN; Wing et al, 1990). 
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SCAN is a semi-structured clinical interview measuring and classifying 
psychopathology and behaviour associated with the major psychiatric disorders in 
adult life. SCAN was originally called Present State Examination. 
Self-report measures were also commonly used and can be differentiated by 
those looking at symptoms associated with a diagnosis of psychosis, and those 
measuring the continuum in experiences of psychosis. Gracie et al, (2007) study 
looked at specific measures of positive symptoms of psychosis: Paranoia Scale 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and Launay Slade Hallucination Scale (Launay & 
Slade, 1981). The Paranoia Scale looks at the severity of paranoia in a non-clinical 
population. The Launay Slade Hallucination Scale measures presence of both clinical 
and subclinical levels of auditory and visual hallucinatory experience. Alsawy et al 
(2015) study used the Psychosis Screening Questionnaire (PSQ; Bebbington & 
Nayani, 1995), which assessed the binary presence of symptoms associated with 
schizophrenia and affective psychosis over the preceding year. Historical psychotic 
experiences are not measures by this scale.   
Three studies used self-report measures of schizotypal traits. Schizotypal 
personality disorders in the DSM-IV lie at the less extreme end of the schizophrenic 
disorders. Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE) 
(Mason et al., 1995) was used in one study (Kocsis-Bogar et al, 2013). The O-LIFE 
has four subscales of symptoms: unusual experiences (consistent with positive 
symptoms), cognitive disorganization, introvertive anhedonia (consistent with 
negative symptoms) and impulsive nonconformity. The scale measures presence and 
not severity of these experiences. Marzillier & Steel (2007) used the Schizotypy 
Personality Scale (STA) (Claridge and Brooks, 1984). This scale uses different 
constructs of schizotypal experiences. It measures the presence of schizotypal traits, 
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such as psychotic episodes, irrational beliefs, cognitive disorganization, anxiety, 
reality distortion, blunted emotions, hostility and asocial behaviour.   
 
3.3. The relationship between re-experiencing and psychosis symptoms   
Thirteen studies investigated the association between the severity of re-
experiencing trauma memories and global, positive, negative and specific psychotic 
symptom. The relationships separated into different symptom dimension are 
summarised in Table Four. 
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Table 4. Summary overview of the studies included in this review 
Author Sample Trauma Exposure  Re-experiencing 
measure 
Psychotic 
Symptom 
measure 
Relationship between psychosis and re-experiencing?  
Hallucinations Paranoia Positive Negative Global 
Gracie et al, 2007 Non-Clinical  Lifetime trauma SRS-PTSD PS and LSHS 
 
 
(+) correlation 
 
 (+) correlation 
- - - 
Alsawy et al, 
2015 
 
Non-Clinical  Lifetime trauma TSQ PSQ  
(+) correlation 
 
 (+) correlation  
- - - 
Bendall et al, 
2013 
FEP Childhood trauma  IES PANSS Trend  
(+) correlation 
- - - - 
Jackson et al, 
2004 
 
FEP Psychosis related:  
First episode 
psychosis 
IES KGV X - X - - 
Schafer et al, 
2011 
 
FEP Childhood trauma IES SCAN - -   
(-) Correlation  
X - 
Harrison & 
Fowler, 2004 
Schizophrenia Psychosis related:  
Psychotic symptoms 
and hospitalisation  
IES-R PANSS - - X  
(+) correlation 
(hospitalisation) 
 
X (symptoms) 
- 
White & Gumley, 
2009 
Schizophrenia Psychosis related: 
Psychosis Illness 
CAPS-S PANSS - - X  
(+) correlation 
  
(+) correlation 
Tarrier et al, 2007 FEP Psychosis related: 
Hospitalisation or 
treatments of illness 
CAPS PANSS - - X X X 
Priebe et al, 1998 Schizophrenia Psychosis related: 
Involuntary hospital 
admission 
PTSD Interview BPRS 
PSE 
- - X 
 
 
- X 
Resnick et al, 
2003 
Schizophrenia Lifetime trauma CAPS PANSS 
 
- - X X X 
Kocsis-Bogar et 
al, 2013 
Non-Clinical Lifetime trauma IES O-LIFE - - (+) correlation (+) correlation (+) correlation 
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Author Sample Trauma Exposure Measure of Re-
experiencing 
Psychotic 
Symptom AX 
Relationship between schizophrenia and re-experiencing 
 
 
Hallucinations Paranoia Positive Negative Global  
Marzillier and 
Steel, 2007 
Clients on a 
trauma 
waiting list 
Lifetime trauma PDS STA - - - -  
(+) correlation 
Shaw et al, 2002 
 
Schizophrenia 
spectrum  
Psychosis related: 
Psychosis and 
treatment  
IES CIDI 
FCRS 
- - - -  
(+) Correlation  
(FCRS) 
 
X (CIDI) 
 
Relationship Summary 
2/3 
 
Some evidence 
2/2 
 
Some evidence 
2/8 
 
No support/little 
evidence 
 
Potential pattern 
by trauma type  
 
Lifetime trauma: 
2/3. Relationships 
opposite direction 
 
PR/Trauma: 0/5 
2.5/6 
 
No support 
/little evidence 
 
No pattern by 
type of trauma 
3.5/7  
 
No support/little 
evidence 
 
 
No pattern by 
type of trauma  
Footnote: “-”: relationship not investigated; “”: the study reported a relationship between psychosis severity and re-experiencing severity; “X”: the study reported a relationship between 
psychosis severity and re-experiencing severity; (+): positive correlation; (-): negative correlation  
First episode psychosis (FEP); Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS) Kay et al., 1987; Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) Overall & Gorham, 1962; Schizotypal Personality Scale 
(STA) Claridge & Broks, 1984; Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE) Mason et al., 1995; The Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN) 
World Health Organization, 1992a; Factor Construct Rating Scale (FCRS) Overall, 1986;  The Paranoia Scale (PS) Fenigstein A, Vanable PA. 1992; The Launay Slade Hallucination Scale 
(LSHS) Launay G, Slade P 1981; Psychosis Screening Questionnaire (PSQ) Bebbington & Nayani, 1995; Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) World Health Organization, 
1990; The Psychiatric Assessment Scale (KGV) Krawiecka, Goldberg & Vaughan, 1977; Impact of Event Scale (IES) Weiss & Marmar, 1997; Impact of Event Scale- Revised (IES-R) Weiss, 
2007; Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) Blake et al., 1990; Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) Foa, Cashman, Jaycox & Perry, 1997).The Self-Report Scale-Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (SRS-PTSD) Carlier I, Lamberts R, Van Uchelen A 1998; Trauma Screening Questionnaire (TSQ) Brewin et al 2002; Trauma Memory Questionnaire (TMQ) Halligan et al. 2003; Post-
traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) Foa, 1995 
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3.3.1 Positive symptoms of psychosis 
The most frequently investigated relationship was of that between a single 
construct of positive symptoms of psychosis and severity of re-experiencing of 
traumatic memories. The majority of studies investigated this relationship (n = 8).  
The majority of these studies (n = 6) did not find a relationship between 
positive symptoms of psychosis and severity of re-experiencing of traumatic 
memories. Of interest, five of these studies were looking at re-experiencing of 
psychosis-related traumas. Despite finding a relationship between severity of re-
experiencing of traumas related to people’s psychosis illness and both global and 
negative symptoms, White & Gumley (2009) did not find a relationship when this 
was restricted to positive symptoms. The same pattern of findings was reported by 
Harrison & Fowler (2004). They also did not find a relationship between positive 
symptoms of psychosis (PANSS) and re-experiencing of experiences linked to their 
psychosis (IES-R). Using a variety of measures of both re-experiencing related to an 
experience of psychosis and psychosis severity, Tarrier et al (2007), Priebe et al 
(1998) and Jackson et al (2004) also did not report a relationship. In addition, one 
study that looked at re-experiencing in relation to a lifetime trauma, also did not find 
a relationship between psychosis and re-experiencing (Resnick et al, 2003).  
While two studies found a relationship between positive symptoms of 
psychosis and re-experiencing, the pattern of this relationship was in opposite 
directions.  Kocsis-Bogar et al (2013) found a positive relationship between re-
experiencing on the IES in relation to any lifetime trauma and psychosis severity on 
the O-LIFE in a non-clinical sample. However, Schafer et al, (2011), found a 
negative relationship in a clinical population: higher frequency of re-experiencing 
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related to childhood trauma on the IES was associated with lower endorsement of 
reality distortion (hallucinations, delusions and thought disorder) on the SCAN.  
The negative correlation was unexpected by the authors. However, they do 
suggest that the findings may reflect that re-experiencing and hallucinations are 
qualitatively different phenomenon. Alternatively, they suggest that while PTSD and 
trauma experience has been associated with hallucinations (Hardy et al., 2005), the 
composition of the SCAN reality distortion subscale is also made up of thought 
disorder and delusional components, which have not been implicated in this 
relationship. In addition, the pattern of findings may reflect that for those with first 
episode psychosis, intrusions of trauma memories may not be attributed to prior 
trauma, but rather give rise to hallucinations and delusional beliefs (Morrison, 2001). 
Finally, they propose that the result may reflect a type I error, due to the multiple 
correlations calculated between subscales on both the measure of psychosis and 
measure of PTSD phenomenon.  
 
3.3.2 Hallucinations 
Four out of thirteen studies investigated the relationships between re-
experiencing of traumatic memories and hallucination severity. In general, the 
studies found some evidence for a positive relationship.  Gracie et al (2007) found a 
positive relationship between re-experiencing of a range of lifetime traumas on the 
SRS-PTSD and hallucinations on the LSHS in a non-clinical population r²=0.26, 
p<0.001. Consistently, Alsawy et al (2005) reported a dose dependent relationship. 
They reported that increased re-experiencing on the THQ, assessing lifetime trauma, 
was significantly associated with hallucinations on the PSQ. Specifically, if an 
individual experienced more than four re-experiencing symptoms, they had more 
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than fourteen times the odds of experiencing hallucinations. While Bendall et al 
(2013) found a positive relationship between increased re-experiencing of childhood 
traumatic memories as measured on the IES, and hallucinations as measured on the 
PANSS at trend level r=.44, p=0.06, this study may have been underpowered to 
identify a statistically significant relationship (n = 13).  
However, Jackson et al (2004) found no correlation between hallucinations as 
measured on the KGV and re-experiencing on the IES, r=0.23, p=0.18. While the 
mean severity of psychosis experience was not reported, the study notes that the 
psychotic symptoms were in remission with a low base rate of severity and re-
experience was restricted to psychosis-related trauma. 
  
3.3.3 Paranoia  
Two out of thirteen studies investigated the relationships between re-
experiencing of traumatic memories and paranoia severity. Both of these studies 
found a positive relationship and, of note, investigated this relationship in a broad 
range of lifetime traumas, not inclusive of psychosis-related trauma. Gracie et al 
(2007) found a positive relationship between re-experiencing of a range of lifetime 
traumas on the SRS-PTSD self-report measure and paranoia on the PS in a non-
clinical population r²=0.31, p<0.001. Alsawy et al (2005) reported a dose dependent 
relationship: increased re-experiencing on the THQ was significantly associated with 
paranoia on the PSQ. Specifically, if an individual experienced more than four re-
experiencing symptoms, they had just under five times the odds of experiencing 
paranoia.   
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3.3.4 Negative symptoms of psychosis 
Half of the studies (n = 6) focused their review of this relationship by looking 
at the relationship between re-experiencing of traumatic memories and negative 
symptom severity. Studies investigating this relationship reported little evidence of 
an association. There was no clear pattern to the findings in relation to trauma type 
(i.e. lifetime trauma vs. psychosis-related trauma).  
Of the three studies investigating the relationship between psychosis and re-
experiencing of lifetime trauma, two did not find a relationship. Schafer et al (2011) 
found no correlation between negative symptoms and re-experiencing of traumas 
related to childhood abuse on the IES. However, the mean severity of psychosis is 
not reported in this study. Resnick et al (2003) did not find a relationship using the 
CAPS and PANSS, and looked at a broader range of traumas, not restricted to 
childhood, although it is, worth noting that there was a low base rate of psychosis 
experiences. However, Kocsis-Bogar et al (2013) did find a relationship between re-
experiencing on the IES in relation to any lifetime trauma and psychosis severity on 
the O-LIFE. 
Three studies investigating the relationship between psychosis and re-
experiencing of psychosis-related trauma. Two studies did not find a relationship. 
Tarrier et al (2007) did not find a relationship when re-experiencing was based on 
traumas related to hospitalisation or treatment of symptoms of psychosis when using 
clinician interview measures of re-experiencing and psychosis. However, the 
statistical values were not reported in the study. White and Gumley (2009) also did 
not find a relationship using the CAPS-S, the gold standard measure of re-
experiencing developed for people with schizophrenia, based on traumas related to 
their experience of psychotic illness and the PANSS. However, one study found that 
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this relationship was dependent on the type of psychosis-related trauma that was the 
basis of re-experiencing. Using the IES-R and PANSS, Harrison and Fowler (2004), 
found that there was a positive relationship between re-experiencing of traumatic 
memories of hospitalisation and negative symptom severity, however this pattern 
was not seen in relation to traumatic memories of psychotic symptoms.  
 
3.3.5 Global symptoms of psychosis 
Seven studies investigated the relationship between global symptoms of 
psychosis and re-experiencing. As found with negative symptoms, there was no clear 
pattern to the findings in relation to trauma type (i.e. lifetime trauma vs. psychosis-
related trauma). 
 While two studies found a positive relationship when lifetime trauma was 
assessed, one study did not. Kocsis-Bogar et al (2013) found a positive relationship 
between re-experiencing on the IES in relation to any lifetime trauma and psychosis 
severity on the O-LIFE. In a population of people attending a trauma service, 
Marzillier and Steel, (2007), found a positive relationship between PDS related to the 
index trauma, and STA completed by the participant in their home environment. 
However, using the CAPS and PANSS, Resnick et al, (2003) did not find this 
relationship.  
Four studies investigating the relationship between psychosis and re-
experiencing specifically related to psychosis-related traumas. One study reported a 
positive relationship. White and Gumley (2009) reported a positive relationship using 
the CAPS-S, the gold standard measure of re-experiencing developed for people with 
schizophrenia, based on traumas related to their experience of psychotic illness and 
the PANSS. However, two studies did not report this relationship (Tarrier et al, 2007; 
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Priebe et al, 1998). Tarrier et al (2007), noted the lack of this relationship between 
severity scores on the CAPS and PANSS in relation to people’s experience of 
hospitalisation and treatment of psychosis illness. However, it is of note that there 
was a low base rate of psychosis experience. Priebe et al (1998) also did not report a 
relationship between re-experiencing as measured by the PTSD interview in relation 
to the participant’s illness, in this case restricted where possible to involuntary 
admission and psychosis measured on both the BPRS and PSE. However, one study 
found that this relationship may be more dependent on the severity of psychosis 
symptoms rather than the global number of symptoms reported. Shaw et al (2002) 
reported a positive relationship between re-experiencing symptoms related to the 
experience of psychosis and treatment on the IES and psychosis severity as measures 
on the FCSR. However, the relationship was not significant with the total number of 
schizophrenia symptoms as measured by the CIDI. Unfortunately, this difference 
between frequency and severity was not investigated by other studies in the review. 
Given the equivocal nature of the findings, the sample sizes of the studies 
were reviewed to explore any issues of power in the studies. Despite differing 
findings, sample size was not identified as a key variable in their interpretation. For 
example, Kocsis-Bogar et al (2013) reported a positive relationship with a large 
sample size (n = 198). However, Priebe et al (1998) did not report relationship with a 
large sample size (n = 105), while White and Gumley reported a positive relationship 
with a small sample size (n = 27).  
 
3.4 Summary  
There appears to be some evidence for a relationship between positive 
symptoms of psychosis and re-experiencing severity, when investigated in relation to 
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specific positive symptom types, specifically hallucination and paranoia. However, 
such findings are based on a limited number of studies. There is currently no 
consistent evidence for a relationship between negative and global symptoms of 
psychosis and severity of re-experiencing of both lifetime and psychosis-related 
traumas.  
 
  4. Discussion 
In line with evidence implicating a causal role for traumatic life events in 
psychosis (Bentall et al, 2014), this review systematically investigated whether the 
severity of re-experiencing trauma memories is associated with psychotic symptom 
across the continuum. 
This review did not find a relationship between global and negative 
symptoms of psychosis, and severity of re-experiencing of traumatic memories. 
Negative symptoms of psychosis may be considered within a two-factor model of 
experiential and expressive symptoms (Horan et al., 2011). It may be, for example, 
that there is a relationship between experiential symptoms and re-experiencing 
severity, but that expressive symptoms confound a relationship being reported in the 
studies.    
While the literature is limited, there is some evidence to support a positive 
relationship between the severity of specific positive symptoms of psychosis, notably 
hallucinations and paranoia, and increased re-experiencing of traumatic memories. 
However, this pattern of findings was not supported when investigated in relation to 
positive symptoms as a whole. It may be that other symptoms, which are part of this 
construct, confound this relationship. For example, formal thought disorder may not 
be linked to severity of re-experiencing and may confound the relationship. 
 44 
 
Therefore, the findings of this review suggest that this further impairment in the 
ability to contextual encode information may be specifically associated with people’s 
experience of intrusions and related appraisals, in line with cognitive-behavioural 
accounts of the mechanisms by which trauma impacts on psychosis (Morrison et al, 
2002; Steel et al, 2006). However, due to the limited number of studies, this review 
calls for more work to conduct a detailed analysis of the relationship between re-
experiencing of traumas and specific psychosis symptoms. 
The current review provides tentative support to the hypothesis that re-
experiencing is a potential mechanism for the specific pathways identified between 
trauma and hallucinations and persecutory beliefs. The findings of the current review 
also mirror those of Bentall et al (2014) who reported a relationship between early 
life trauma and hallucinations and persecutory beliefs. However, this review suggests 
that the relationship may also be expanded to later life traumas. Cognitive-
behavioural models of psychosis can be drawn on to provide an account for why 
severity of hallucinations may be related to severity of re-experiencing (Morrison et 
al, 2003). Such models suggest that traumatic memories, which by their nature 
contain sensory-perceptual information and have limited corresponding contextual 
information, may not be attributed to prior trauma. Such intrusions, notably those of 
both visual and auditory nature, are more likely to lend themselves to be interpreted 
as visual and auditory hallucinations.  
However, the relationship between hallucinatory experiences and intrusive re-
experiencing may be more complex. McCarthy-Jones and colleagues (McCarthy-
Jones et al, 2014) found supporting evidence for five differing subtypes of auditory 
verbal hallucinations: hypervigilance, autobiographical memory, inner speech, 
epileptic, deafferentation. Phenomenological differences are reported across these 
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subtypes. For example, autobiographical memory subtypes of hallucinations are 
rooted in past memory, (McCarthy-Jones, Trauer, Mackinnon, Sims, Thomas & 
Copolov, 2014), with the voices being verbatim replays of verbal content in a 
traumatic situation, or may reflect altered verbal content given the reconstructive 
aspect of recall (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Alternatively, hypervigilant 
subtype of auditory verbal hallucinations may be an experience of hearing a 
threatening voice in the environment as a result of increased hypervigilance 
following from a stressful life event. Therefore, it may be that different subtypes of 
hallucinations may have a different relationship with severity of re-experiencing, 
highlighting the complexity in understanding this relationship.  
 
  4.1 Limitations 
Only a small number of studies have attempted to investigate the relationship 
between the severity of psychosis symptoms and severity of re-experiencing of 
traumatic memories. Within these studies, there is a large variation in the 
measurement of re-experiencing of traumatic memories and psychosis. This raises 
concerns whether studies are measuring the same construct. However, research has 
established the consistency between different measures of re-experiencing. 
Examining the psychometric properties of the CAPS against the IES, Hovens, Van 
Der Ploeg, Klaarenbeek, Bramsen, Schreuder & Rivero (1994) reported that they are 
measuring the same construct (≥r=0.66), suggesting the findings from the different 
studies of re-experiencing of traumatic memory can be reliably synthesised. Despite 
such attempts in the literature to allow synthesis of findings using these different 
measurements, studies included in this review only assessed re-experiencing in 
relation to an index trauma, and so key intrusions may be missed which are related to 
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a second trauma event and may be key in understanding this relationship. Therefore, 
to more fully understand the relationship between trauma memory and psychosis we 
need to assess more comprehensively these two constructs.  
 Of interest, non-clinical populations were more likely to find that those with 
increased experiencing of schizotypal traits and sub-clinical psychosis symptom had 
an increased severity of re-experiencing memories of traumatic life events. The 
larger sample sizes in these populations may have enabled them to detect smaller 
effect sizes, which may have not been identified in the clinical sample due to the 
smaller sample sizes.  
In this review, no studies reported a relationship between positive symptoms 
of psychosis and re-experiencing related to psychosis-related trauma, however, 
relationships were identified in relation to lifetime traumas, although different 
directions of the relationship were reported. This highlights a challenge, and a 
potential measurement issue, which is posed when looking at the relationship 
between re-experience of psychosis-related traumatic memories and psychosis 
symptoms. This is due to the complexity in discriminating psychotic symptoms and 
such intrusive memories, given the high rates of co-morbid PTSD in this population 
(Grubaugh et al, 2011) and the current lack of validated psychosis-related trauma 
assessments (Fornells-Ambrojo, Gracie, Brewin & Hardy, 2016). 
While psychotic symptoms can be experienced as an on-going trauma 
(Bendall et al, 2012) and thus a sense of current threat (Gumley & Schwannauer, 
2006), it is possible for current and past threat to be differentiated if the individual 
with psychosis is adequately orientated, using anchoring questions to the traumatic 
stressor (Chisholm et al, 2006; Harrison & Fowler, 2004). The CAPS-S (Gearon et 
al, 2004) has been developed to measure PTSD symptoms in people with psychosis. 
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By investigating the temporal relationship between when the traumatic experience 
happened and the first symptoms of psychosis, and by understanding an individual’s 
appraisal of the traumatic event and symptoms commonly associated with PTSD, this 
enables and supports the differentiation of psychosis related PTSD symptoms from 
those of current psychosis. This review therefore calls for this relationship to be 
further investigated using measures like the CAP-S which have been developed to 
allow differentiation of PTSD symptoms from those of current psychosis.  
 Further, recommendations have been made for the similarity between the re-
experiencing symptoms reported and the content of the traumatic event to be 
assessed (Fornells-Ambrojo et al, 2016).  
Due to the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the methodological 
review of cross-sectional studies (Katrak et al, 2004), uality rating of these studies 
were determined by developing a quality assessment tool. However, there were a 
number of limitations to using this tool. While it has its strengths to being developed 
specifically to assess the methodological items which are expected to be most 
relevant in answering the review question, psychometric properties of the validity 
and reliability of the tool were therefore not established.  
 
4.2 Further research 
Given the limitations highlighted in this review, to understand the 
relationship between trauma memory and psychosis, studies are needed which 
comprehensively assess an individual’s trauma history, measure the severity of re-
experiencing in response to a complex number of traumas and investigate this in 
relation to specific symptoms of psychosis, rather than more globally measured 
symptoms. Thus, further research looking at these specific relationships is warranted, 
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to explore re-experiencing as one potential mechanism in understanding the 
relationship between trauma and psychosis. To comprehensively assess this 
relationship, continued development of validated psychosis-related trauma 
assessments and methodology to assess all intrusive experiences in relation to trauma 
are required. For example, studies which use the experience sampling method as a 
research procedure for studying re-experiencing would help to explore these 
relationships.  
This review highlights further gaps in the literature. While research into the 
severity of re-experiencing of traumatic memories in people with psychosis is 
common, the phenomenology of these memories have not been sufficiently explored. 
In particular, further research is needed to investigate the coherence of unwanted 
traumatic memories. This would enable further investigation of theories proposed by 
Steel and colleagues (2005) who suggest that retrieval of traumatic memory is more 
incoherent in people with psychosis.  
 
4.3 Clinical implications 
The review highlights an emerging literature base which supports the 
relationship between the severity of a person’s experience of hallucinations and 
paranoia, and increased symptoms associated with re-experiencing of a personal 
traumatic event. Increased re-experiencing in this specific subset of people 
vulnerable to experiencing psychosis may form intrusions that shape anomalous 
experience. It may be more difficult for some individuals to be able to identify the 
origin of the unwanted memory as connected to a past personal experience (Steel et 
al, 2005; Larøi, Collignon & Van der Linden, 2005). Within such a situation, 
individuals are likely to draw upon their existing belief system, to try and make sense 
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of these experiences and may be prone to appraising re-experiencing of past 
traumatic events as the product of an external entity or lend themselves to other 
‘culturally unacceptable appraisals’ (Garety et al, 2001; Morrison, 2001).  
Clinically it may therefore be important to target re-experiencing of traumatic 
memories in those experiencing hallucinations and paranoid thoughts using trauma-
focused cognitive behavioural methods, such as exposure based techniques, which 
have been shown to be effective in psychosis (van den Berg et al, 2015). Imagery 
rescripting has been identified as a brief stand-alone treatment targeting involuntary 
memories in participants with depression (Brewin et al, 2009) and it may be that 
similar clinical interventions would be effective in targeting hyper-accessible 
distressing memories in a subset of the psychosis population.  
 
4.4 Conclusions  
This review suggests that individuals experiencing hallucinations and 
paranoia report increased re-experiencing of traumatic memories. However, this 
potential vulnerability in contextually encoding information is not a general feature 
in psychosis. Methodological improvements are required to ascertain if the existing 
findings are replicable and to examine more comprehensively the role of unwanted 
traumatic memory in the development and maintenance of psychosis.   
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Abstract 
Aims: Interest in trauma as a causal factor in psychosis has prompted research into 
how trauma-related processes may account for the development and maintenance of 
psychosis. The aim of the current study was to investigate one potential cognitive 
mechanism by examining the phenomenology of intrusive trauma memory in 
psychosis and its relationship with hallucinations and persecutory beliefs.  It was 
hypothesised that intrusive memory fragmentation would be associated with 
hallucinatory severity.   
Method: Twenty participants described an intrusive trauma memory and its 
phenomenological characteristics 
Results: Intrusive memories were experienced as vivid, distressing and 
accompanied by physical sensations. Memories were typically not accompanied by 
an out of body experience, but were accompanied by multi-sensory modalities and 
fear. Intrusions were viewed from a field perspective and with a low sense of 
perceived control. Findings indicated that subjective fragmentation of intrusive 
memories were associated with more severe hallucinations but not persecutory 
beliefs, although the relationship between the two ratings of objective memory 
fragmentation and hallucinations was equivocal, with a negative correlation for one 
rating and no relationship for the other. There was no relationship between reliving 
and symptom severity. People with an experience of psychosis had more frequent 
and vivid intrusions, with an increased sense of reliving than the non-clinical sample. 
However, they reported relatively more coherent intrusive memories.  
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Conclusions: The study suggests a potential role for memory fragmentation 
in hallucinatory experience, although the complexities of assessing memory 
characteristics are highlighted and ideas for future research are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
Research into Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has led to the 
development of cognitive behavioural theories which highlight the role of intrusive 
trauma memories, maladaptive trauma-related appraisals and affect regulation as key 
maintenance processes (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin, Lipton, Gregory & Burgess, 
2010; Gumley, Braehler & Laithwaite, 2010; Morrison, Frame & Larkin, 2003; 
Read, Fosse, Moskowitz & Perry, 2014; Steel, Fowler & Holmes, 2005). Such 
advances have informed the development of treatments targeting these mechanisms, 
which are now recommended by National Institute of Health and Social Care 
Excellence (NICE, 2005). Interest in the causal role of trauma in psychosis, and the 
higher rates of co-morbid PTSD in this population, has also prompted research in 
trauma-related processes in psychosis (Bendall, Alvarez-Jimenez, Hulbert, McGorry 
& Jackson, 2014; Varese et al, 2012; Grubaugh, Zinzow, Paul, Egede, & Frueh, 
2011). In addition to events in which ‘the person experienced, witnessed or was 
confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious 
injury, or a threat to physical integrity of self or others’ (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), the experience of psychosis and its treatment can also be 
traumatic, and lead to posttraumatic stress reactions (Morrison et al., 2003; Berry, 
Ford, Jellico-Jones, & Haddock, 2013; Cusack, Frueh, Hiers, Suffoletta-Maierle, & 
Bennet, 2003; Mueser, Lu, Rosenberg, & Wolfe, 2010). Evidence suggests potential 
specific pathways between early life trauma and hallucinations and persecutory 
beliefs (Bentall et al, 2014). This study will therefore investigate one potential 
cognitive mechanism by examining the phenomenology of intrusive trauma memory 
in psychosis, and its relationship to hallucinations and persecutory beliefs. 
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1.1 Phenomenology of intrusive memory in other disorders 
In order to understand how intrusive trauma memories may play a role in 
psychosis, it is helpful to consider findings from studies investigating trauma 
memory in other disorders. Intrusive trauma memories can be conceptualised as an 
experience when a memory is triggered involuntarily, rather than deliberately 
recalled, by stimuli associated with the event or its consequences (Brewin, Dalgleish 
& Joseph, 1996, Brewin, 2001, Conway & Pleydell Pearce, 2000, Ehlers & Clark, 
2000). 
Intrusive memories in PTSD are characterised by vivid, sensory-perceptual 
content of parts of the traumatic events (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Hackmann, Ehlers, 
Speckens, & Clark, 2004; Mellman & Davis, 1985; Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995; 
Brewin, et al, 2010). The lack of narrative information regarding when and where the 
experience occurred, means they are more likely to be experienced as 
decontextualized fragments occurring in the ‘here and now’ (Hopper & van der Kolk, 
2001; Byrne, Hyman, & Scott, 2001; Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; Halligan, 
Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003).   
It is now acknowledged that intrusive trauma memories are transdiagnostic 
experiences present in a range of disorders such as depression and social anxiety 
(Kuyken & Brewin, 1994). Reynolds and Brewin (1999) compared self-reported 
characteristics of intrusive memories in people with depression and PTSD (N = 105).  
They found similar levels of distress and attempts to avoid the intrusive memory. 
However, the PTSD group’s intrusions were characterised by increased dissociation 
and ‘here and now’ reliving.  This suggests that whilst intrusive memories occur 
across a range of disorders, the phenomenology of intrusions may vary.   
 
 64 
 
1.2 Theories of intrusive memories  
Cognitive-behavioural models outline how disruptions to memory encoding 
during trauma may contribute to the phenomenology of intrusive memories.  When 
an individual is confronted with intense distress, rather than the information related 
to this event passing through the hippocampus, it is processed by a more direct route 
to the amygdala (LeDoux, Iwata, Cicchetti & Reis, 1988). This enables quicker 
release of stress hormones (LeDoux, et al, 1988) and faster or data-driven processing 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000), which allows the individual to rapidly activate threat 
reduction strategies.  However, this processing is done at the expense of the 
hippocampus’s ability to process and integrate information within a spatial and 
temporal context (contextually bound representations, C-reps) (Brewin, 2001; 
Brewin et al, 2010; Layton & Krikorian, 2002). Instead, the sensory and emotional 
details of the event are stored (low-level sensation-based representations, S-reps), 
with less corresponding C-reps.  
Autobiographical memories are hierarchically organised, representing 
different levels of specificity (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Lifetime periods 
form the most general level of knowledge and consist of prolonged periods of time. 
General events are clustered within each lifetime period. Event-specific knowledge 
forms the greatest level of specificity, containing detailed sensory-perceptual 
information about the event. Therefore, memories of everyday events contain both 
contextual information and specific information about what is experienced. However, 
due to the lack of contextual information during encoding of traumatic events 
(Brewin, 2001; Brewin et al, 2010; Layton & Krikorian, 2002), these memories are 
particularly likely to be triggered by stimuli that represent sensory-perceptual 
matching cues in the environment and are therefore easily triggered involuntarily into 
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consciousness. Due to the lack of contextual encoding, the traumatic memory is not 
elaborated and integrated into lifetime and general event themes. Relevant 
information is not available to be accessed by conscious retrieval processes, this can 
result in memories which are problematic to intentionally recall (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). 
Intrusions in PTSD are therefore held to result from automatic activation of 
stored sensory memories without corresponding spatial-temporal representations, 
meaning that they are experienced as vivid, and occurring in the ‘here and now’ 
(Brewin, et al, 2010).  In contrast, however, intrusive memories reported in 
depression are conceptualised as involving thematic and associative indirect retrieval 
of the memory, whereby corresponding autobiographical, spatial-temporal and 
sensory representations of the memory are recalled (Brewin et al, 2010). This 
difference in the retrieval of contextual information related to the event may account 
for the increased re-experiencing reported in intrusive memories in people with 
PTSD compared to those with depression.  Thus, the extent to which contextual 
information is encoded at the time of trauma and subsequently retrieved, could 
determine the degree to which subsequent intrusions are experienced as fragmented.  
 
1.3 Intrusive trauma memory in psychosis 
To date, despite the interest in trauma in psychosis, there has been relatively 
little investigation of the phenomenology of intrusive memories. However, theories 
have implicated the possible importance of these memories in psychosis (Steel, 
Fowler, & Holmes, 2005; Morrison, 2001; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & 
Bebbington, 2001).   
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Morrison (2001) model suggests that intrusive memories are implicated as an 
important route for the development of, and exacerbating psychotic symptoms, as 
they may not be attributed to prior trauma. While Morrison’s model (2001) 
normalises the experience of intrusions, the appraisal of these intrusions in a 
culturally unacceptable way, leads to these being experienced, or conceptualised by 
others, as hallucinations or delusional beliefs. In support of this model, Morrison et 
al (2002) identified that the majority of clients with psychosis reported intrusive 
images (74.3%), with 70.8% being associated with memories. However, this study 
did not examine the phenomenology of these memories in detail. 
However, Garety et al (2001) suggests that these intrusions may be 
anomalous in people with psychosis due to cognitive processing disturbances, and 
highlights this as one proximal route to the development of positive symptoms. 
Garety and colleagues (2001) suggest that one conceptualisation of this disturbance 
is the `weakening of the influence of stored memories of regularities of previous 
input on current perception', (Hemsley, 1993), which subsequently leads to 
ambiguous sensory input, experienced as intrusion of material from an individual’s 
memory.  
Steel and colleagues (Fowler et al, 2006; Steel et al, 2005) propose that the 
strength of an individual’s ability to integrate contextual and sensory information 
moderates the nature and prevalence of intrusions. People high in schizotypal traits 
and with psychosis are hypothesised to have a weakened ability to encode spatial and 
temporal information, possibly due to enhanced emotional or stress sensitivity 
(Fowler et al, 2006; Read, Fosse, Moskowitz, & Perry, 2014). Therefore, people with 
psychosis may be particularly vulnerable to encoding memories in such a way as to 
increase the likelihood of more frequent, vivid and fragmented intrusions, which may 
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manifest as hallucinatory experiences. In support of these hypotheses, Jones and 
Steel (2014) found that there was an increased vulnerability to intrusive memories 
following a word association task in a sample (n = 23) of people with schizophrenia 
and high reported levels of PTSD symptoms. Marks, Steel and Peters (2012), also 
found that individuals who reported anomalous experiences (n = 23) reported a lower 
level of trait contextual integration and more intrusions than individuals with low 
schizotypal traits (n = 26) after watching a trauma film, both immediately and over 
the subsequent seven days. Their intrusions were also more vivid and associated with 
emotion. Glazer, Mason, King, and Brewin (2013) also found an association between 
poor contextual memory, an increased sense of ‘nowness’ and intrusive images in 55 
non-clinical participants, with intrusive images also being associated with psychosis-
proneness.  
In line with theoretical accounts of psychosis, this study will explore the 
phenomenology of intrusive memories, with a specific focus on the relationship 
between fragmentation and hallucinatory experience. 
 
1.4 Conceptual and measurement issues  
There are a number of definitions of fragmentation in regards to trauma 
memory in the literature (see Table One for an overview of subjective and objective 
ratings of fragmentation employed in the current study). Some researchers define 
fragmentation as memory confusion (Foa et al, 1995; Halligan et al, 2003), others as 
abnormal chronology (Byrne et al 2001) and others as an increase of sensory 
components (Hopper & van der Kolk, 2001). In addition, the terms fragmentation, 
incoherence and disorganisation are often used interchangeably and operationalised 
differently across the literature. For example, Murray, Ehlers and Mayou (2002) 
 68 
 
rated objective fragmentation on a scale ranging from ‘very coherent’ to ‘very 
incoherent’. Foa et al. (1995), regarded repetitions in narratives as evidence of 
fragmentation, and defined disorganisation as ‘confused or disjointed thoughts’. 
Halligan et al. (2003) investigated disorganisation based on two measures of 
objective ratings. One measure coded repetition, uncertainty and non-consecutive 
chunks, and the second used a global rating of coherence, from ‘not at all 
disorganised’ ‘to extremely disorganised’.  
To date, fragmentation of memory has only been applied and investigated in 
memories which have been intentionally recalled. As such, all measures to 
investigate fragmentation have been developed within this context, either using a 
narrative coding measure or meta-memory subjective appraisal approach (Bedard-
Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012). 
In contrast, lack of contextualisation of intrusions has previously been 
conceptualised in relation to the sense of reliving associated with recall of the 
memory. However, as reviewed above, theories of psychosis have highlighted 
contextualisation difficulties in people with psychosis as a mechanism in psychotic 
intrusions (Steel et al, 2005). Fragmentation may therefore be a relevant 
characteristic in understanding the relationship between intrusive memories, 
hallucinations and persecutory beliefs and this study will therefore be the first to 
examine fragmentation of intrusive memory in people with psychosis. 
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Table 1. Operationalisation of the construct of fragmentation 
Construct Rating Item Scale Previous study 
Fragmentation Subjective Holding in mind your 
most frequent intrusive 
memory, how much 
does your intrusive 
memory exist of 
loosely related pieces 
or images?  
10-point scale. 0 = a 
coherent image, 10 = 
lots of loosely related 
images 
Kindt et al 
(2005) 
Are your intrusive 
memories in any way 
unclear or jumbled?  
 
4-point scale. 0 = not at 
all, 3 =  very much 
Murray et al 
(2002) 
Fragmentation  Objective Raters coded intrusive 
narrative on a four-
point scale  
 
(0 = ’very coherent’, 1 
= ‘quite coherent’, 2 = 
’not very coherent’, 3 = 
’very incoherent’) 
Murray et al 
(2002) 
Raters coded utterance 
categories which most 
directly reflected 
fragmentation, in order 
of priority  
Repetition, (utterance 
repeated more than 
once within five lines), 
unfinished thoughts 
and speech fillers (e.g. 
‘um’, ‘so’, ‘like’) 
Foa et al 
(1995) 
  
1.5 Summary 
In summary, the above literature demonstrates that intrusive trauma 
memories are present in psychosis and may share some similar characteristics to 
those experienced in other disorders. However, intrusive memories in psychosis 
could be more fragmented, vivid and associated with an increased sense of reliving 
than in other disorders, and this may play a role in the development and maintenance 
of psychotic symptom severity.  
 
1.6 Aims 
The study will investigate the phenomenology of intrusive trauma memory in 
psychosis and its relationship to hallucinations and persecutory beliefs.   
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1.7 Hypotheses 
It is hypothesised: 
1. Increased memory fragmentation will be associated with more severe 
hallucinations and persecutory beliefs.  
2. Increased reliving will be associated with more severe hallucinations. 
3. Intrusive trauma memories in psychosis will be more frequent, vivid, fragmented 
and associated with an increased sense of reliving compared to a non-clinical 
sample. 
4. Intrusive trauma memories will be more frequent, vivid, fragmented and 
associated with an increased sense of reliving, compared to voluntary recall 
of trauma memories in psychosis. 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Study design 
The study is a theoretically informed phenomenological study with an 
observational, cross-sectional design using interview and questionnaire assessments. 
 
2.2 Ethics 
Ethical approval was provided by London Queens Square Research Ethics 
Committee (REC reference: 15/LO/1486) (see Appendix A). Approval was also 
gained from National Health Service Research and Development Departments for the 
clinical sample (see Appendices B and C). All participants were provided with 
written information about the study and gave their informed consent prior to 
participating (see Appendices D and E). 
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2.3 Participants  
In order to be eligible, clinical participants were required to: 1) Have a 
current primary diagnosis of affective or non-affective psychosis; 2) No primary 
diagnosis of intellectual disability, head injury, substance misuse or known organic 
cause for psychosis; 3) Mental state sufficiently stable to participate in research; 4) A 
standard of written and spoken English to be able to provide informed consent and 
complete assessment measures; 5) At least 16 years old.  The same inclusion criteria 
applied to the non-clinical sample, although they were excluded if currently 
experiencing psychotic symptoms.  
 
2.4 Measures 
2.4.1 Trauma Screening Questionnaire (TSQ; Brewin et al, 2002) 
The TSQ is a PTSD screening instrument and was adapted from the PTSD 
Symptom Scale (PSS, Foa et al. 1993). The TSQ is a ten-item instrument consisting 
of five re-experiencing (e.g. upsetting thoughts or memories about the event that 
have come into your mind against your will) and five arousal items (e.g. being jumpy 
or being startled at something unexpected) from the DSM-IV PTSD criteria 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Participants were asked whether or not 
they had experienced each symptom at least twice in the past week. When endorsing 
at least six arousal or re-experiencing symptoms, the TSQ demonstrates excellent 
sensitivity (0.86), specificity (0.93), and overall efficiency (0.90) (Brewin et al, 
2002). 
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2.4.2 Community Assessment of Psychic Experience (Konings, Bak, Hanssen, Van 
Os, & Krabbendam, 2006). 
The CAPE is a 42-item self-report questionnaire with items covering three 
symptom dimensions: positive symptoms (e.g. do you ever hear voices when you are 
alone), depressive symptoms (e.g. do you ever feel sad) and negative symptoms (e.g.  
do you ever feel that your feelings are lacking in intensity). A 4-point Likert scale (0 
to 3) assesses symptom frequency (rated “Never”, “Sometimes”, “Often” and 
“Nearly always”), and distress due to the symptom, if present (rated “Not distressed”, 
“A bit distressed”, “Quite distressed”, and “Very distressed”). The CAPE 
demonstrated good internal consistency on all symptom dimensions (positive α = 
0.82, negative α = 0.81, depression α = 0.83) (Brenner et al, 2007). Since the CAPE 
has been developed as a three factor model, research has attempted to develop a 
factor model for the positive dimension. For the purpose of this study, perceptual 
abnormalities (items 33, 34, 42) and persecutory ideation (items 2, 6, 7, 10, 22) were 
derived from four factor models (Yung, Nelson, Baker, Buckby, Baksheev, & 
Cosgrave, 2009; Núñez, Arias, Vogel, & Gómez, 2015; Armando et al, 2010; Capra, 
Kavanagh, Hides, & Scott, 2013). For clarity, within this study, perceptual 
abnormalities and persecutory ideation will be referred to as hallucinations and 
persecutory beliefs respectively.  
 
2.4.3 Phenomenology of intrusive memory interview 
Due to the lack of consensus on the assessment of intrusive trauma memories, 
and different approaches employed, a semi-structured interview was developed to 
explore the phenomenology of intrusive trauma memories, based on Hackmann, 
Ehlers, Speckens and Clark (2004), Reynolds and Brewin (1999), Laing, Morland 
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and Fornells-Ambrojo (2015), Kindt, Van den Hout and Buck (2005) and Murray, 
Ehlers and Mayou (2002) (see Appendix F). The interview schedule included an 
open prompt to elicit a narrative of the intrusive memory, with follow-up questions 
to assess the self-reported phenomenological characteristics of the memory (see 
Table Two). Self-reported phenomenological characteristics of the intentional recall 
of the same memory were assessed in those who had intentionally recalled the 
memory in the past month (see Appendix F). Feasibility and Support to Timely 
recruitment for Research, a service of individuals with experience of mental health 
problems and their carers who have been specially trained were consulted in the 
development of the interview schedule. The interview was then piloted in a clinical 
sample (n=2) and adapted accordingly.  
Table 2. Questions to assess the self-reported phenomenological characteristics of the memory 
 
Phenomenological 
characteristics  
Question Rating  Reference 
Frequency/duration How long has it been since 
the event featuring in the 
intrusive memory? 
(1) less than 1 year ago, (2) 
1–5 years ago or (3) more 
than 5 years ago 
Reynolds & 
Brewin, 
(1999) 
Approximately how often 
has the intrusive memory 
that bothers you the most 
occurred in the past two 
weeks? 
(1) once a week or less, (2) 
several times a week, (3) 
once a day, (4) several 
times a day or more; 
Reynolds & 
Brewin, 
(1999) 
When you experience this 
intrusive memory, how 
long does it last? 
(1) seconds, (2) minutes, 
(3) up to an hour, (4) 
several hours and (5) 
constantly preoccupied; 
Reynolds & 
Brewin, 
(1999) 
Distress  How distressing is the 
intrusive memory?   
10-point scale. 0 = no 
distress, 10 = extreme 
distress  
Reynolds & 
Brewin, 
(1999) 
Sensory-perceptual Holding in mind your most 
frequent intrusive memory, 
how clear and vivid was the 
memory? 
(1) unclear/hazy, (2) some 
detail, (3) vivid, (4) very 
vivid – like it was 
happening in the here and 
now 
Reynolds & 
Brewin, 
(1999) 
When the intrusive memory 
came into you mind, do you 
feel as if you are reliving 
the memory, as if it is 
happening again now or 
5-point scale. 0 = reliving 
the experience, 5 = looking 
back at the past  
Reynolds & 
Brewin, 
(1999) 
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experiencing the memory 
as having happened in the 
past? 
Was the intrusive memory 
accompanied by an out of 
body experience? 
(1) experience absent or (2) 
experience present 
Reynolds & 
Brewin, 
(1999) 
Do you have strong 
physical sensations in the 
intrusive memory such as 
heart racing, sweating, 
trembling, nausea, 
headache, chills/flushes, 
and ‘butterflies in the 
stomach? 
(1) no physical sensations 
or (2) physical sensations 
present 
Reynolds & 
Brewin, 
(1999) 
In the intrusive memory, 
what do you see, hear, feel, 
smell and/or taste? 
 (1) Visual, (2) Auditory, 
(3) Taste, (4) Smell, (5) 
Tactile 
Hackmann et 
al (2004) 
In the intrusive memory, 
what emotions or feelings 
do you have? 
Initially unprompted, and 
then asked if the memory 
was associated with any of 
the following emotions: (1) 
Sad, (2) Anger, (3) 
Humiliation, (4) Guilt, (5) 
Anxious, (6) Powerless, (7) 
Ashamed, (8) Helpless, (9) 
Disgust, (10) Fear    
Laing et al 
(2015) 
Control  When this intrusive 
memory pops into your 
mind or comes out of the 
blue, how much do you feel 
you have control over 
stopping this memory? 
4-point scale. 0 = not at all, 
4 = very much.  
Laing et al 
(2015) 
Perspective Thinking about the memory 
we just discussed, do you 
mostly view the situation as 
if you are looking out 
through your eyes, or one 
in which you are looking at 
yourself from outside of 
yourself? Or does it switch 
between the two views? 
(0) alternating, (1) field, 
(2) observer. 
Laing et al 
(2015) 
Fragmentation Holding in mind your most 
frequent intrusive memory, 
how much does your 
intrusive memory exist of 
loosely related pieces or 
images? 
10-point scale. 0 = a 
coherent image, 10 = lots 
of loosely related images  
Kindt et al 
(2005) 
Are your intrusive 
memories in any way 
unclear or jumbled? 
4-point scale. 0 = not at all, 
3 =  very much  
Murray et al 
(2002) 
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2.4.4 Objective memory fragmentation measurement  
As there is no gold standard way of objectively measuring fragmentation of 
an intrusive memory, this study analysed fragmentation using a rating scale (Murray 
et al, 2002) and a coding manual (Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995) developed to rate 
fragmentation of intentionally recalled trauma memories (see Appendix G). 
Objective memory fragmentation was first measured using the coding manual 
developed by Foa et al (1995). Because narratives varied in length across 
participants, percentage of the narrative which were coded as this utterance were 
calculated separately for each participant. Narratives were then rated by the first 
author using methodology outlined by Murray et al (2002), without knowledge of the 
participant’s symptom scores.  
2.5 Procedure  
Clinical participants were recruited from outpatient clinical teams in two 
NHS Trusts. Potential clinical participants were approached by their allocated 
clinician if they met the inclusion criteria. If they expressed interest in the study, 
potential participants were invited to go through the informed consent process with a 
member of the research team. Recruitment and data collection were carried out in 
conjunction with another researcher, as part of a joint project (see Appendix H). 
Consenting participants completed the questionnaire and interview battery. In 
addition to the measures reported on in this study (TSQ, CAPE, phenomenology of 
intrusive memory interview, objective memory fragmentation measurement), 
participants also completed the Trauma and Life Event Screening Tool (TALE), 
Trauma History Questionnaire (THQ) (Green, 1996), Childhood Trauma 
Questionnaire (CTQ) (Bernstein et al, 1994), PTSD Assessment Tool for 
Schizophrenia (PATS) (Mueser, Lu, Rosenberg & Wolfe, 2010) and Posttraumatic 
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Figure 1. Systematic recruitment flow diagram for the clinical sample 
Cognitions Inventory (PCI) (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin & Orsillo, 1999), (please see 
Sarah Carr’s thesis). The procedure for clinical participants is outlined in Figure 1. 
Participants were reimbursed £10 for their time and expenses.  
The non-clinical sample was recruited through advertising online via social 
media and University College London university email circulars. They completed the 
questionnaires via Limesurvey (Schmitz, 2012) an online open source survey 
application.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All clinical and non-clinical participants completed the Trauma Screening 
Questionnaire (Brewin et al, 2002) to identify if an individual had experienced 
intrusive trauma memories at least twice in the past week (i.e. at least one ‘yes’ 
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response to items one or three on the TSQ). The phenomenology of these intrusive 
trauma memories was investigated using the semi-structured interview assessment of 
traumatic memories. The phenomenology of the intentional recall of the trauma 
memory was assessed in those who had intentionally recalled the memory in the past 
month. All participants completed the Community Assessment of Psychic 
Experience (Konings et al, 2006) to measure frequency and distress of psychosis 
symptoms. The narratives of the intrusive memories reported were transcribed by the 
first author. Following transcription, the narratives were objectively rated to measure 
fragmentation.  
 
2.6 Power calculation 
This is a theoretically informed study of the phenomenology of intrusive 
trauma memories in psychosis, and the relationship between memory fragmentation 
and psychotic symptoms has not previously been explored. However, the relationship 
between memory fragmentation and PTSD symptoms has been investigated. 
Therefore, power analysis of this study was informed by prior work of Murray et al 
(2002). This study found a medium effect size (r=0.41), of the positive relationship 
between memory fragmentation and PTSD severity, based on objective rating taken 
at a single time point. Power calculations were carried out using “G*Power 3” 
computer program (Faul, Erdfelder, Land & Buchner, 2007), specifying alpha=5%, 
and desired power=80% (Cohen, 1992). The required sample size was estimated at 
35.  
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2.7 Statistical analysis  
Analyses were conducted using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences for 
Windows (version 21.0). Prior to descriptive and statistical analyses, all data was 
explored for assumptions of normality and examined for outliers. Categorical data 
was analysed for independence and expected frequencies. Where expected frequency 
assumptions were violated, Fisher’s exact tests were used. Two variables (Self-
reported memory fragmentation (Murray et al, 2002) and hallucination distress) had 
skewness of >1.96. Square root transformations were performed and were successful 
in improving the approximation of the variables to normal distributions to allow for 
parametric tests to be conducted. Age was positively skewed in the non-clinical 
sample and in the clinical sample who did not report intrusive trauma memories, 2.10 
and 4.24, respectively. The distribution of age in the clinical sample who did not 
report intrusive trauma memories, was also leptokurtic (4.71). It was not possible to 
correct this distribution using square root transformations and as such non-parametric 
tests were used. All other variables had skewness and kurtosis values of <1.96 at 
p<0.05, indicating that the variables were sufficiently normally distributed. There 
was one outlier in the age dataset which fell three SD above the mean (z = 3.07) and 
as such was excluded from the analysis. An α level of 0.05 for statistical significance 
was used for all tests. Significance test results are quoted as two-tailed probabilities.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Participants 
Sixty potential clinical participants were referred by clinical staff. Thirty-nine 
clinical participants consented to take part in the research and were screened for 
inclusion, of which 20 experienced intrusive memories of past traumas at least twice 
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in the past week. Nineteen participants in the non-clinical sample reported intrusive 
trauma memories. The samples were compared on demographic and clinical 
characteristics. The findings are shown in Table Three. There were no significant 
differences in age, gender or ethnicity across the groups. The clinical sample with 
intrusive memories had significantly higher symptom severity than the non-clinical 
sample (p = .046). There was no difference between the clinical samples reporting 
and not reporting intrusive trauma memories (p = .832). While the clinical sample 
with no intrusive memories reported higher symptom severity than the non-clinical 
sample, this difference was not significant (p = .514).   
 
Table 3. Demographic and clinical characteristics 
Variable  Clinical 
Sample with 
ITMᵃ N=20 
(51.3%) 
 
 
Frequency/  
M (SD) 
Clinical 
Sample with 
no ITM  
N=19 
(48.7%) 
 
Frequency/  
M (SD) 
Non-clinical 
Sample with 
ITM N=19 
(15.7%) 
 
 
Frequency/  
M (SD) 
Statistics* P 
Age  36.70 
(13.67) 
 
28.26 (12.28) 
 
31.16 (11.59) 
 
H(2) = 
5.79 
.055 
Sex Male 
Female 
8 (40%) 
12 (60%) 
13 (68.4%) 
6 (31.6%) 
9 (47.4%) 
10 (52.6%) 
X²(2) = 
3.37 
.186 
Ethnicity Black 
White 
Asian 
Mixed 
7 (35%) 
8 (40%) 
3 (15%) 
2 (10%) 
3 (15.8%) 
10 (52.6%) 
5 (26.3%) 
1 (5.3% 
1 (5.3%) 
16 (84.2%) 
2 (10.5%) 
0 (0%) 
- .067 
CAPE Frequency 42.50 
(19.62) 
35.63 (22.13) 26.84 (16.45)   
 
* Kruskal-Wallis analysis was conducted for age as the data was positively skewed and could not be corrected 
using transformations. Fisher’s exact test used for ethnicity as two or more cells had an expected cell count of less 
than 5. 
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3.2 Phenomenological characteristics of intrusive trauma memories in psychosis 
3.2.1 Type of events experienced as intrusive memories 
Eighteen of the clinical participants provided a narrative of an intrusive 
trauma memory. Thematic analysis was performed to identify the type of events 
subsequently experienced as intrusive memories (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Five 
themes were identified: sexual abuse, physical violence, psychological, physical 
illness and experience of psychosis. The frequency of each event themes is presented 
in Table Four. An 80% reliability rate is considered acceptable in thematic analysis 
(Marques & McCall, 2005). 100% reliability rate was achieved by the first author 
and second rater. Intrusive trauma memories were most frequently related to people’s 
experiences of psychosis, sexual and physical abuse.  
 
Table 4. Content of intrusive memory 
 
* N=1 participant included both sexual and physical abuse and thus is include in both themes. N=1 
participant included sexual abuse and experience of psychosis and thus is include in both themes 
 
3.2.2 Frequency/duration 
Intrusive memories tended to be associated with more distant events. Sixty-
five percent (n = 13) reported it was more than five years since the event related to 
their intrusive memory.  Twenty-five percent (n = 5) said it was one to five years ago 
and 10% (n = 2), reported more recent events, less than one year ago. There was a 
Type of event 
 
N / %* Example event  
Experience of psychosis 5 / 25% ‘Hearing voices of builders when I was at home on the 
opposite side of the street’ 
Sexual abuse 5 / 25% ‘Taken advantage of sexually by an older man’ 
 
Physical violence 5 / 25% ‘Partner throwing me down the stairs’  
 
Psychological   3 / 15% ‘When I found out my daughter wasn’t mine when she 
was born’ 
Physical illness 2 / 10% ‘Being physically ill for a long time after getting 
malaria’ 
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large variation in regards to the frequency of the intrusive memory. Forty percent of 
the sample (n = 8) reported that they experienced the intrusive memory once a week 
or less, 25% (n = 5) reported it occurring several times a week and 35% (n = 7) 
several times a day or more. When investigating the duration of the intrusive 
memory, the majority of the sample (60%, n = 12) reported it lasted minutes, with 
20% (n = 4) lasting for seconds, 15% (n = 3) being constantly preoccupied, and 5% 
(n = 1) reported that the memory lasted several hours.   
 
3.2.3 Distress 
In general, the intrusive memories were experienced as distressing (M = 7.40, 
SD = 2.06, range 3-10). 
 
3.2.4 Sensory-perceptual 
The memories were overwhelmingly described as vivid (80%, n = 16), with 
15% (n = 3) described as including some detail and only one memory was described 
as unclear or hazy (5%). There was a large range in the experience of reliving the 
memory (0-5) with the mean reliving intensity being 2.80 (SD = 1.82). Ten percent 
(n = 2) of the participants reported an out of body experience accompanying the 
memory. Seventy-five percent (n = 15) of the group reported physical sensations 
accompanying the memory. 
Data on the sensory modalities accompanying the intrusive trauma memory 
were available for eighteen participants. The most common sensory modality to 
accompany the intrusive memory was sight (94.4% (n = 17). Sixty-one percent (n = 
11) said it was accompanied by sound and 16.7% (n = 3) by smell and tactile 
sensations. For example, one participant said that they could smell petrol that was 
 82 
 
linked to the place in which they were sexually abused. No one reported associated 
taste. Seventy percent of participants reported multiple sensory modalities 
accompanying the memory (n = 14), with 71.43% of these multiple sensory 
modalities memories being accompanied by both sight and sound (n = 10).  
Data on the emotions accompanying the intrusive trauma memory were 
available for nineteen participants. The emotions most frequently reported as 
associated with the intrusive memory, were fear (84.2%, n = 16), helplessness and 
anxiety (73.7%, n = 14), sadness (68.4%, n = 13), anger (63.2%, n = 12), 
powerlessness (57.9%, n = 11), humiliation, shame and disgust (42.1%, n = 8). The 
emotion least frequently associated with the intrusive memory was guilt (26.3%, n = 
5).  
 
3.2.5 Control  
Perceived sense of control over the intrusive memory was generally low (M = 
0.85, SD = 0.88, range 0-3). 
 
3.2.6 Perspective 
The memories were overwhelmingly described as being experienced from a 
field perspective (60% of the time, n = 12), with 15% (n = 3) described as from an 
observer perspective and 25% (n = 5) as alternating between these perspectives. 
 
3.2.7 Memory fragmentation 
3.2.7.1 Subjective memory fragmentation  
On the self-report question measuring memory fragmentation on a 10 point 
scale, with lower scores indicating a more coherent image and higher scores 
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reflecting fragmentation (Kindt et al, 2005), intrusive memories were perceived as 
more coherent than fragmented (M = 3.10, SD = 3.11). On the self-report question 
measuring memory fragmentation on a 4 point scale, where 0 = not at all 
unclear/jumbled, 3 = very much unclear/jumbled (Murray et al, 2002), in general, 
memories were perceived as reflective of a more clear and unjumbled image (M = 
0.75, SD =1.07). 
 
3.2.7.2 Objective memory fragmentation  
Of the twenty intrusive memories reported, two people were not able to 
provide a narrative to allow for objective coding and two people provided a narrative 
but did not consent for this to be audio recorded, therefore the exact nature of the 
narrative could not be accurately transcribed. Results of objective ratings of memory 
fragmentation will therefore be drawn from sixteen narrations. Based on Foa’s 
(1995) coding manual, the means and standard deviations for each of the utterance 
representative of fragmentation across the sample are reported in Table Five. All 
narratives were rated by the first author. Five of the studies were double rated 
(31.25%) which indicated good inter-rater reliability (ICC .839, CI = .023 - .982). 
 
 
Table 5. A table to show the mean percentage of repetition, unfinished thoughts and speech filler 
utterances and standard deviation and range 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fragmentation Mean Percentage SD Range 
Repetitions 6.00% 4.13 0 - 16.13 % 
Unfinished thoughts 17.63% 6.56 6.45 - 26.73 % 
Speech fillers  16.30% 10.42 3.23 – 39.06 % 
Total Frequency 39.35% 11.65 17.86 – 60.94 % 
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Descriptive statistics of objective memory fragmentation measured using 
Murray et al (2002) 4-point scale, found that mean fragmentation was 1.69 (SD = 
.70, range 1-3). This suggests that on average the narratives were rated as between 
quite coherent to not very coherent, and that no narratives were rated as very 
coherent. Five of the studies were double rated (31.25%) which indicated good inter-
rater reliability (ICC .810, CI = .127 - .978). 
 
 3.2.7.3 Summary and relationship between fragmentation measures 
Subjective ratings of fragmentation are relatively low indicating that 
intrusions are experienced as coherent, however objective ratings of fragmentation 
suggested that intrusions were more fragmented than coherent.  Therefore, the 
relationships between the different measures of fragmentation were explored. There 
was a significant positive correlation between the different measures of subjective 
fragmentation (r = .62, p = .004) suggesting that they may be effective in measuring 
the same construct. However, there was a non-significant, small negative correlation 
between objectively measured fragmentation using the Foa et al (1995) coding 
manual and Murray et al (2002) 4-point scale (r = -.28, p = .290), suggesting no 
relationship between the objective fragmentation measures.  
There was no relationship between any of the measures of subjective memory 
fragmentation and objective memory fragmentation, (subjective memory 
fragmentation (Kindt et al, 2005) and objective memory fragmentation, Foa et al, 
1995, r = -.13, p = .622; Murray et al, 2002, r = -.09, p = .751), subjective memory 
fragmentation (Murray et al, 2002) and objective memory fragmentation, Foa et al, 
1995, r = .02, p = .930; Murray et al, 2002, r = -.05, p = .857). 
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3.3 Hypothesis one: Increased memory fragmentation will be associated with 
more severe hallucinations and persecutory beliefs.   
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess 
the relationships between intrusive trauma memory fragmentation and hallucinations 
and persecutory beliefs. The means, standard deviations and Pearson’s correlations 
are presented in Table Six.  
 
3.3.1 Subjective memory fragmentation  
As predicted, participants who rated their memories as more fragmented 
experienced more frequent and distressing hallucinations. This relationship was 
significant between subjective memory fragmentation (Kindt et al, 2005) and distress 
associated with hallucinations (r = .46, p = .048).  The relationships between 
subjective memory fragmentation and frequency of hallucinations did not reach 
significance. However, moderate to large effect sizes were reported in the 
hypothesised direction. However, there was no relationship between subjective 
memory fragmentation and persecutory beliefs.   
 
3.3.2 Objective memory fragmentation  
The relationship between objective memory fragmentation and psychosis 
symptoms were more equivocal. The size and direction of these relationships varied 
depending on the specific psychosis symptoms under investigation and the 
methodology used to code for fragmentation of the narratives. Participants whose 
memories were rated as objectively more fragmented using Foa et al (1995) coding 
manual were less likely to experience hallucinations with a medium to large effect, at 
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a statistical trend level (r = -.49, p = .054).  All other correlations were non-
significant with weak or small effect sizes.  
 
 
   
  
8
7
 
Table 6. Correlations between subjective memory fragmentation, objective memory fragmentation and positive symptom severity 
Variable (range) M SD  Subjective 
fragmentation (Kindt 
et al, 2005) (0-10) 
Subjective 
Fragmentation 
(Murray et al, 2002) 
(0-3) 
Objective 
Fragmentation (Foa et 
al, 1995) (17.86% - 
60.94%) 
Objective  
Fragmentation 
(Murray et al, 2002) 
(1-3) 
Persecutory Ideation Frequency 
(0-14) 
 
5.45 (N = 20) 
5.88 (N = 16) 
3.49  
3.70 
r 
p 
-.23 
.324 
.06 
.816 
-.17 
.541 
.21 
.426 
Persecution Ideation Distress  
(0-11) 
 
5.63 (N = 19) 
5.67 (N = 15) 
3.52 
3.31  
r 
p 
-.29 
.231 
.12 
.620 
-.08 
.776 
.17 
.536 
Persecution Ideation Total  
(0-23) 
 
11.11 (N = 19) 
11.6 (N = 15) 
6.60 
6.78 
r 
p 
-.28 
.244 
.10 
.690 
-.13 
.655 
.201 
.473 
Hallucinations Frequency  
(0-8) 
 
2.20 (N = 20) 
2.69 (N = 16) 
2.51  
2.56 
r 
p 
.36 
.117 
.39 
.092 
-.49 
0.054 
.02 
.953 
Hallucination Distress  
(0-9) 
 
2.26 (N=19) 
2.80 (N=15) 
 
2.79  
2.91 
r 
p 
.46* 
.048 
.40 
.092 
-.30 
.286 
-.01 
.986 
Hallucinations Total  
(0-15) 
 
4.53 (N=19) 
5.60 (N=15) 
 
5.17 
5.32 
r 
p 
.45 
.051 
.46* 
.047 
-.35 
.204 
-.13 
.654 
* p < .05 significance, ** p < .01 
M and SD are reported twice to be inclusive of the different participant’s data used in the different correlational analysis   
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3.4 Hypothesis two: Increased reliving will be associated with more severe 
hallucinations. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient assessed the relationships 
between reliving associated with intrusive trauma memories, hallucinations and 
persecutory beliefs. All correlations were non-significant (see Table Seven). 
 
Table 7. Correlations between reliving and positive symptom severity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Hypothesis three: Intrusive trauma memories in psychosis will be more 
frequent, vivid, fragmented and with an increased sense of reliving compared to 
a non-clinical sample 
There was a significant difference in frequency of the intrusive memories, 
using a Fisher’s Exact Test on people in the clinical and non-clinical sample (p = 
.02). As predicted, in the clinical sample the memories were described as occurring 
more frequently. As described previously, the clinical sample most frequently 
reported that they experienced intrusive memories, once a week or less, followed by 
several times a day or more. 68.4% of the non-clinical sample (n = 13) reported that 
they experienced the intrusive memory once a week or less, 26.3% (n = 5) reported it 
occurring several times a week, one person (5.3%) reported that they experienced the 
Variable (range)  Reliving (0-5) 
Persecutory Ideation Frequency (0-14) 
 
r 
p 
-.184 
.438 
Persecution Ideation Distress (0-11) 
 
r 
p 
-.195 
.423 
Persecution Ideation Total (0-23) 
 
r 
p 
-.203 
.404 
Hallucinations Frequency (0-8) 
 
r 
p 
-.014 
.954 
Hallucination Distress (0-9) 
 
r 
p 
.087 
.724 
Hallucinations Total (0-15) 
 
r 
p 
.055 
.824 
  
  89 
  
intrusive memory once a day. No one reported that they experienced the intrusive 
memory several times a day or more.  
There was a significant difference in vividness of intrusive memories, using a 
Fisher’s Exact Test on people in the clinical and non-clinical sample (p = .048). As 
predicted, the clinical sample described their memories as more vivid. As described 
previously, in the clinical sample the memories were overwhelmingly described as 
vivid, with only one participant reporting that the memory was unclear or hazy. In 
the non-clinical sample, the memories were described as less vivid with five people 
reporting that the memory was unclear or hazy (26.3%), 31.6% (n = 6) described as 
including some detail, and 42.1% described the intrusive memory as vivid (n = 8).   
An independent samples t-test found no evidence of a significant difference between 
people with psychosis (M = 2.8, SD = 1.82) and the non-clinical sample (M = 3.79, 
SD = 1.18) on degree of reliving associated with the intrusive memories t(32.76) = -
2.02, p = .052, d = 0.84. However, people with psychosis tended to report the 
memory was associated with a higher degree of reliving.  
There was increased self-reported fragmentation in the non-clinical sample 
than the clinical sample. When asked how much the memory existed of loosely 
related pieces or images, intrusive memories were rated as significantly more 
fragmented in the non-clinical sample (M = 5.58, SD = 3.25) than the psychosis 
sample (M = 3.10, SD = 3.11), t(37) = -2.43), p = 0.02, d = .76, 95% CI of the 
difference = -4.54 to -.52. However, a significant difference was not seen between 
the clinical (M = .54, SD = .70) and non-clinical sample (M = .95, SD = .62 when 
asked if the intrusive memory was in any way unclear or jumbled, t(37) = -1.95, p = 
0.06, CI [-.84, .01]. 
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3.6 Hypothesis four: Intrusive trauma memories will be more frequent, vivid, 
fragmented and associated with an increased sense of reliving compared to 
voluntary recall of trauma memories in psychosis. 
Four participants reported that they had intentionally recalled their trauma 
memory in the past month. Therefore, there was not enough data to carry out 
statistical hypothesis testing. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table Eight. 
Where small differences were seen, these were in the hypothesised direction. 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of intrusive and voluntary recall of trauma memories 
Variable  
 
 Intrusive memory 
Frequency / M (range) 
Voluntary memory 
Frequency/ M (SD) 
Sense of reliving  
 
 2.50 (0-4) 3.50 (2-5) 
Fragmentation 
Kindt et al (2005) 
 5 (0-8) 4.25 (0-9) 
Fragmentation 
Murray et al (2002) 
 1.50 (0-2) 1 (0-2) 
Vividness unclear 
vivid 
very vivid 
0 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
Frequency once a week 
several times a day 
2 
2 
3 
1 
 
 
4. Discussion 
To our knowledge this is the first study to report on the phenomenology of 
intrusive trauma memory in psychosis and its relationship to hallucinations and 
persecutory beliefs. 
4.1 Summary 
Intrusive memories in this sample tended to be related to distant events, were 
experienced as overwhelmingly vivid, distressing and accompanied by physical 
sensations. Memories were typically not accompanied by an out of body experience, 
but were accompanied by multi-sensory modalities and fear. Memories generally 
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lasted minutes, were viewed from a field perspective and with a low sense of 
perceived control. Intrusive memory frequency and reliving intensity varied within 
the sample.  
Consistent with other studies, this study found that intrusions were sometimes 
related to the experience of psychosis (Berry et al, 2013) and supports the suggestion 
that such experience would meet the relevant criteria within the ICD-10 diagnosis of 
PTSD (World Health Organisation, 1992).   
The phenomenological investigation was largely based on the work of 
Reynolds and Brewin (1999), who reported qualities of intrusive memories in people 
with PTSD and depression. Whilst the sample in the current study was not matched 
to the characteristics of the previous work, the phenomenology of the memory 
qualities was similar across the diagnostic groups in regards to physical sensations 
(PTSD, 74%; Psychosis, 75%; Depression, 62%), level of distress (PTSD & 
Depression, M = 7.9; Psychosis, M = 7.4) and vividness (PTSD & Depression, 88%; 
Psychosis, 80%). As the present study used a continuous scale to assess reliving, 
findings cannot be compared to that of Reynolds and Brewin (1999) as they used a 
dichotomous response.   However, fewer people with psychosis reported an out-of-
body experience (PTSD, 42%; Depression, 20%; Psychosis, 10%). This suggests that 
the presence of an out-of-body experience may be a quality of the memory that 
differentiates intrusive memories in PTSD from those in other disorders. 
 As predicted, further findings of interest indicated that subjective 
fragmentation of intrusive memories was associated with more severe hallucinations. 
It is of note that the relationship between fragmentation and persecutory beliefs was 
not observed, suggesting the effect was specific to hallucinations. Such findings are 
consistent with Steel and colleagues (2005) theoretical accounts that people with 
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psychosis have a weakened ability to contextually integrate information. The 
relationship between objective memory fragmentation and hallucinations was 
equivocal, with a negative correlation for one rating and no relationship for the other. 
When interpreting these findings, it is important to consider explanations 
within the context of the methodology employed and the conceptual construct of 
fragmentation. Measurement of fragmentation of intrusive memories was adapted 
from the intentional recall literature. The methodologies used in this study may not 
be adequately developed to measure fragmentation for this purpose, as the retrieval 
processes involved in these experiences are different than those involved in 
intentional recall. Consequently, it may be that measures of fragmentation of these 
two different types of memory recall are tapping into overlapping, or differing 
constructs. It may be more theoretically applicable for measures of fragmentation of 
intrusions to look more explicitly, for example, at the degree of temporal and 
contextual information, nature of sensory memory, coherence of images linked in a 
narrative, as opposed to repetition (Foa et al, 1995) or a general sense of coherence 
(Murray et al, 2002).  
 Nonetheless, the significant and predicted relationship between subjective 
fragmentation and hallucination severity, suggests that the items used to measure 
fragmentation were reflective of memory contextualisation. In the PTSD literature, 
contextualisation has been primarily defined in relation to the sense of reliving. This 
is the index of lack of contextualisation more commonly associated with memory 
intrusions, and which may be a more valid construct given the strong sensory 
impressions associated with the memory (Brewin et al, 1996; Ehlers, Hackmann, & 
Michael, 2004).  However, reliving in this study was not associated with 
hallucinatory severity. It may be that when intrusions are sufficiently contextualised 
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to be associated with a ‘here and now’ experience of a past trauma, they are less 
likely to play a role in hallucinatory experience, whereas when contextualisation is 
more severe and memory fragmentation inhibits an awareness of the relationship 
between intrusions and prior trauma experience, hallucinations are more likely to 
occur. However, given the small sample size and identified conceptual and 
measurement issues, caution is required when interpreting this patterns of findings. 
 As hypothesised, people with an experience of psychosis had more frequent 
and vivid intrusions, with an increased sense of reliving, than the non-clinical 
sample.  These findings are in line with previous studies by Marks and colleagues 
(2012) and Glazer and colleagues (2013) who reported that people with proneness to 
psychotic experiences have a predisposition to experience greater levels of 
intrusions, due to a relatively weakened ability to integrate information within a 
spatial-temporal context (Steel et al, 2005). Increased stress may further weaken this 
ability, (Fowler et al, 2006; Read et al, 2014), with traumatic memories being 
particularly vulnerable to intruding. These theories are consistent with our current 
data, which extend previous studies findings by specifically investigating traumatic 
intrusions in a clinical sample with psychosis, and comparing to a non-clinical group.     
 However, it is of note that people with psychosis reported more coherent 
intrusive memories than the non-clinical sample. It is similarly importance to 
consider the methodological and theoretical validity of measurements of 
fragmentation and the impact this may have on these findings.   
 While initial findings are consistent with the PTSD models of intrusions 
being more frequent, vivid, and associated with an increased sense of reliving than 
voluntary recall of trauma memories (Brewin et al, 2010), such differences observed 
were small. There was insufficient data in the current study to investigate these 
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relationships with inferential statistics, and further research is needed to see if the 
findings replicate.   
 
4.2 Limitations 
While the semi-structured interview was able to explore the phenomenology 
of intrusive memories, retrospective judgments are often viewed as having limited 
reliability (Priebe et al., 2013). Constraints could be further implicated in a psychosis 
sample where meta-memory bias is more pronounced, i.e. knowledge and awareness 
of your own memory (Eisenacher et al, 2015). Alternative methodologies could 
therefore also be considered to investigate the phenomenology of memory and its 
relationship to psychosis. Previous studies have found that diaries are an effective 
and reliable way of recording the occurrence of intrusions (Marks et al, 2012; 
Holmes & Steel, 2004). This would allow for more contextual information to be 
gathered and ‘real-time’ responses. 
Due to a delay in starting recruitment, the desired sample size of 35 was not 
reached. A power analysis was carried out to determine the effect size that the 
achieved sample of N = 20 was powered to detect. Using G-Power (Faul, et al. 2007) 
and specifying alpha=5%, desired power=80% (Cohen, 1992), the sample provided 
sufficient power to detect large effect size, greater or equal to r = .53. Therefore, 
while the study was underpowered to detect small and medium effects, large effects 
were identified. While further research is needed in a larger sample to observe if the 
identified relationships replicate, this study was the first phenomenological study of 
the nature of intrusive memories in psychosis and so offers valuable initial insights.  
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4.3 Clinical implications 
The current recommended treatments for psychosis are cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) and family interventions (NICE, 2014). Individual CBT has effect 
sizes in the small to medium range (Jauhar, McKenna, Radua, Fung, Salvador & 
Laws, 2014; Burns, Erickson & Brenner, 2014; van der Gaag, Valmaggia & Smit, 
2014; Turner, van der Gaag, Karyotaki & Cuijpers, 2014). Whilst the development of 
talking treatments for psychosis is promising, there have been calls to further 
improve effectiveness by targeting the underlying mechanisms (Freeman & Garety, 
2013).  This study starts to elucidate how cognitive processes may contribute to the 
development and maintenance of psychosis occurring in the context of trauma, and 
potentially emphasises the importance of contextualising trauma memories, 
consistent with a recent trial and best-practice guidance supporting the efficacy of 
trauma-focused exposure treatments in psychosis (NICE, 2014; van den Berg et al, 
2015)   
 
4.4 Further research  
Morrison et al (2002) highlights important links between memories of 
traumatic events and the content of images associated with psychotic symptoms. It 
would have been of additional scientific value for this study to further this 
investigation by considering the relationships between the trauma events, the content 
of intrusive memories and the content of hallucinations and persecutory beliefs. In 
addition, while aiming to investigate the similar and differing natures of voluntary 
recall of traumatic memories, and intrusive trauma memories, asking participants to 
report on intrusions and voluntary recall of neutral memories, would have allowed a 
clearer insight into what phenomenological aspects of the memory are unique to 
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traumatic events in this population. However, such avenues were beyond the scope 
of the present study, due to the further demands this would place on the participants, 
although future research investigating these relationships would be valuable. 
 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
The study suggests a potential role for memory fragmentation in hallucinatory 
experience, although given the small sample size and identified conceptual and 
measurement considerations, caution is required when interpreting this finding. 
While our study is only a starting point for this line of enquiry, it may form the basis 
of further research within this pioneering area.  
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Critical appraisal 
When the opportunity first arose to study intrusive trauma memories and their 
relationship with psychosis, I was attracted to doing a study which considered this 
cognitive process in an applied setting. It seemed striking to me that given the high 
rates of trauma in psychosis (Grubaugh, Zinzow, Paul, Egede & Frueh, 2011; Varese 
et al, 2012), the understanding about what trauma memories are like for people with 
psychosis, and the evidence to support therapeutic input directly around these 
underlying mechanism, were limited. However, the research process highlighted to 
me some of the barriers to extending research within the area of trauma and 
psychosis, and the importance of difficult methodological choices when conducting 
research.  
This critical appraisal will firstly reflect on the complexities of the 
methodological choices in measuring the phenomenology of intrusive memories; and 
relationship with psychosis severity. I will then focus on the practicalities of this as a 
research area, given the difficulties with recruitment in this field. Finally, I will 
explore how the research process shaped my clinical work and future career interests.   
 
1. Methodological choices   
There were several difficult choices to make in the course of conducting this 
study, all of which had implications for the study as a whole.  
 
1.1 Semi-structured interview 
A detailed description of intrusive memories in psychosis had not yet been 
investigated. I was particularly interested in developing an initial understanding of an 
individual’s experience of these memories, given the new area of research. I wanted 
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to get a clearer insight into the nature of people’s subjective appraisal of the 
experience. However, given the novelty of the research area, I thought it was 
important to build on previous methodology to explore the phenomenon.   
One strength of this approach was that it allowed for a comparison between 
this area and other psychopathologies, to help determine the uniqueness of the 
experience in people with psychosis. It was therefore decided to use a semi-
structured interview, which required participants to retrospectively report previous 
experienced intrusive memories, adapted from Reynolds and Brewin (1996).  
Participants were asked if they had noticed ‘memories of any of these deaths, life 
events, or childhood experiences, or of any other negative event spontaneously 
coming into their minds during the past week’. A qualifying statement was made to 
ensure participants were reporting on a memory which consisted of a visual image of 
an event which had taken place. Participants were asked to identify two intrusive 
memories and to report on the associated emotions of each one. This was followed 
by a series of questions which gathered descriptive information about characteristics 
of this memory. For this, participants were asked to respond using binary or multiple 
choice responses (Reynolds & Brewin, 1996). This method was used to study the 
characteristics of intrusive memories in people with post-traumatic stress disorder 
and depression, with similar self-report approaches used in the field. This approach 
therefore allowed me to compare across diagnostic categories and to start to identify 
the similarities and differences in the phenomenology of memories of traumatic 
experiences in psychosis. 
However, using this methodology to investigate intrusive memories, raised 
some challenges in the specific context of psychosis. I will go on to explore this in 
  
  110 
  
relation to specific memory problems in people with psychosis and general critique 
of retrospective reports of experiences. 
 While psychosis has been implicated as associated with a wide range of 
cognitive impairments (Fioravanti, Carlone, Vitale, Cinti, & Clare, 2005), memory is 
perhaps the most severely impaired (Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998; Aleman, Hijman, 
de Haan, & Kahn, 1999). This finding has been seen in both first episode psychosis 
(Albus et al., 2006) and chronic populations (Paulsen et al., 1995). A recent meta-
analysis examined impairment specifically in voluntary autobiographical memory 
recall in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (Berna et al, 2016) and reported impaired 
recall of past personal memories, with recollection being less vivid and specific. 
Meta-memory bias is more pronounced in people with psychosis, i.e. knowledge and 
awareness of your own memory (Eisenacher et al, 2015). A number of studies have 
specifically implicated that people with psychosis are less confident in their 
responses, whilst also demonstrating overconﬁdence in errors (Moritz, Woodward, & 
Ruff, 2003; Moritz, Woodward, & Hausmann, 2006a). Subsequently, this makes the 
investigation of the subjective nature of memory constructs difficult in this 
population. 
 In addition to the difficulties which individuals presenting with schizophrenia 
face when asked to report on aspects of their own memory, retrospective memory 
judgments are often viewed as having limited reliability (Priebe, Kleindienst, 
Zimmer, Koudela, Ebner-Priemer, Bohus, 2013) as they can be based on biased 
storage and recollection of personal memories (Ebner-Priemer & Trull, 2009). For 
example, rather than being based on the overall experience, there is a tendency to be 
biased by the most prominent and recent experience, (peak-end rule) (Kahneman, 
Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993). 
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 This therefore raises the questions of whether intrusive memories are 
currently assessed in the most appropriate way in the literature, and extends this 
question to the specific context of assessment in people with psychosis. As intrusive 
memories are commonly triggered in response to both internal and external cues, 
retrospective questionnaire items about the frequency of intrusive memories, may not 
be the most valid and reliable assessment method (Brewin, 2015).  
 Electronic diaries have been used when conducting research in a number of 
psychiatric populations, which aim to address recall biases by enabling real-time 
assessment. Priebe and colleagues (2013), used such an approach to investigate 
intrusions and flashbacks related to childhood sexual abuse in female participants. 
While this study did not ask for detailed descriptions of these intrusions, they found 
that when electronic diaries were used to record intrusions and flashbacks, there was 
a 50% increase, compared to retrospective assessment.  
While such a methodology could be considered to gather the information 
relevant to this research topic, this would have financially been outside the scope of a 
DClinPsy research study. However, attempts to do ‘real time’ assessment with paper 
diaries have been identified as an effective and reliable way of recording the 
occurrence of intrusions in psychosis (Marks, Steel, & Peters, 2012; Holmes & Steel, 
2004). This would allow for more contextual information to be gathered and ‘real-
time’ responses. However, this approach may have raised ethical considerations with 
regards to people being asked, not just to record frequency of intrusions, but also to 
record the subjective experience, and provide a narrative of these experiences, in 
situations which may not be containing and with appropriate support afterwards if 
needed. Such alternative approaches were therefore not considered to be appropriate 
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in order to gather the data to answer the current research question in a safe and 
containing way.   
 
1.2. Measures of psychosis  
Due to the data for this study being collected as part of a joint research 
project, the methodological choices relevant to my study required consideration in 
relation to those needed for the Carr (2016) study. It was important to be mindful of 
the length of the assessment session to allow us to pool together our recruitment 
resources and ensure that data for both projects could be collected without becoming 
burdensome for participants. Subsequently, research team discussions were held to 
consider appropriate methodological choices. I will reflect on one such example. 
Standardised clinician administered measures are considered to be the gold 
standard for measurement of psychosis symptoms. The Brief Psychiatric Rating 
Scale (Lukoff, Liberman, Nuechterlein, 1986a) is one example of an interviewer-
based measure which is often used as a measure of symptom severity in psychiatric 
populations and allows evaluation of a wide range of symptoms (Burlingame et al, 
2005). However, due to the number of other questionnaires and interviews needed to 
be included in the assessment battery of this study, the research team met to discuss 
what would be a valid way of measuring symptoms of psychosis, given the time 
restraints of the research session.  
We started to consider shorter measures and focused on self-report measures. 
While self-report measures are less routinely used in research to examine symptom 
outcomes than clinician-administered measures (Burlingame et al., 2005), the 
advantages are that they are often less time intensive to administer and to score and 
interpret. However, self-report questionnaire are widely recognised as being 
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vulnerable to bias in responding, particularly social desirability bias. Social 
desirability is the tendency of respondent to answer questions in a way to be viewed 
in a positive light by others. In reference to these questions, it may be under-
reporting ‘undesirable’ symptoms, particular those associated with positive 
symptoms of psychosis, as the participants may already have experience of others not 
believing their reports. Evidence has been found in a non-clinical sample where, with 
the exception of hallucinations, reporting of psychosis symptoms were subject to 
social desirability biases (DeVylder & Hilimire, 2015).  
Therefore, the decision was made, after weighing up all of these 
considerations, to use the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences as a 
measure of psychosis symptoms (Konings, Bak, Hanssen, Van Os, & Krabbendam, 
2006). The experience made me reflect on the difficult considerations in research 
when all options have their associated weaknesses, and practical considerations need 
to be given as much importance as conceptual issues. It highlighted the further 
methodological considerations when working as part of a joint research team.  
 
2. Recruitment challenges  
Recruitment is viewed as the conversations which take place between a 
researcher and potential participants. Therefore, the recruitment process is reflected 
from the initial process of starting dialogues with NHS sites, then on to generating 
interest for the study with potential participants and obtaining informed consent, 
based on the sharing of appropriate information.  
In view of the challenges in recruiting participants for this study, 
considerations need to be given to the barriers at an organisational level. Initially, 
barriers arose in this study in relation to recruiting trusts allowing us to conduct the 
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research in specific parts of their service. The trust which we first approached had a 
strong research base, especially in the areas of early intervention, psychological 
therapies and treatment resistant psychosis and my supervisors held posts in both a 
clinical and research capacity. The services provided in this trust are organised into 
Clinical Academic Groups (CAGs), one of which is the psychosis CAG.  This CAG 
covers 74 teams and upwards of 7000 service users. Prior permission must be sought 
from the CAG before initial services can be approached about hosting the research. 
Unfortunately, due to the large number of granted research projects planning to take 
place in the early intervention services, a two-way correspondence between our 
research team and the CAG about the feasibility of the research, led to a final 
decision being made that they could not host the research. This provided a useful 
insight into the demands placed on early intervention services, and a need to protect 
both the clinicians and potential participants. This reflects a national pattern, with 
early intervention services being asking more frequently to host research than those 
services specialising in promoting recovery and complex care. However, given my 
interest in exploring the phenomenology of intrusive trauma memories in a psychosis 
population, I was keen to ensure I captured participant’s diverse experiences from 
across a spectrum of presentations. Unfortunately, this process lasted a number of 
months and therefore delayed the granting of ethical approval, and subsequently 
delayed established links with other NHS Trust.    
 When choosing this research topic, I was mindful of the potential barrier of 
recruiting people with psychosis into research, when asking them to reflect on 
previous trauma memories. I was aware, from my discussions with researchers in this 
area, that both positive and negative symptoms associated with psychosis can have 
an impact on people’s ability to engage with the research process. People with 
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predominantly positive symptoms may be paranoid and suspicious of the intentions 
of the research. Those with negative symptoms are often more unmotivated to take 
part in research. Such findings are common across the literature (Lester & Wilson, 
1999; Woodall et al, 2011). However, in our research 65% of potential participants 
who gave their initial consent to their clinician to be contacted by the research team, 
then gave informed consent to take part in the study.   
What I had not been mindful of at the beginning of the research process was 
that a main barrier to participant recruitment was clinicians discussing the research 
project with their clients. My previous research experience of recruiting nursing staff 
to implement clinical interventions on a psychiatric ward, had shown me the 
importance of developing strong working relationships with clinicians. I was 
therefore aware of the importance of the research project being a collaboration with 
clinicians (Patel, Doku, Tennakoon, 2003) and paid particular attention to the attitude 
of clinical staff. After initially meetings with different teams, I was optimistic about 
their warm reception and interest in the research, and I therefore expected that 
clinicians would start discussing the research with their clients. However, only a 
small number of potential participants’ information was passed on to the research 
team.  
Spending time exploring the motivational needs of clinical staff can lead to a 
more helpful understanding of how to achieve successful collaboration (Young & 
Dombrowski, 1989). I therefore started to consider the motivational needs of the 
clinicians and the additional pressures. I initially considered it from the context of the 
high volume of pressure experienced by the staff and on the service. Demands of 
mental health services are rising. An increase of 4.9% was seen in people in contact 
with mental health services from 2013/2014 to 2014/2015 (Health and Social Care 
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Information Centre, 2015b). Over this same time period, around 40% of mental 
health trusts experienced reductions in income. While over the past three years most 
trusts have been in financial surplus, there appears to be decreased spending on 
community mental health teams (The King’s Fund, 2015). There has also been a 
reduction in staffing levels with 8% of early intervention psychosis services having 
lost staff in the previous year (Rethink Mental Illness, 2014), and no service able to 
deliver NICE-concordant services to more than 50% of new clients with first episode 
psychosis (Khan & Brabham, 2015). Taken together, this reflects an increased 
pressure on clinicians in the services in which we were aiming to carry out our 
research.  
While being an important variable in understanding the challenges to 
clinicians referring potential participants; a pattern started to emerge as to the 
services and clinicians within these services, who more commonly discussed the 
research with their clients. After establishing more trusting relationships with some 
of the staff team, this allowed me to try to understand further constraints, and a 
common theme was the clinician’s worries about the psychological impact the 
research would have on their clients. Specifically, that asking clients about traumatic 
past event experiences would cause overwhelming distress.   
Such worries are not uncommon when conducting trauma-related research 
and are sometimes shared by Institutional Review Bodies (Jaffe, DiLillo, Hoffman, 
Haikalis & Dykstra, 2015). I hoped to reduce this anxiety by sharing with the teams 
the precautions I would put in place, in order to limit the impact of taking part in the 
research for clients, and to ensure clinicians were aware of the value of the research, 
which has also been cited as an important part of the collaboration process (Bell, 
1993; Miller, Rosenstein, & DeRenzo, 1998). I particularly found it helpful to share 
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with clinicians the findings of Jaffe and colleagues (2015) who reported that while 
there is evidence for some immediate distress following trauma-related research, this 
is not extreme. Additionally, in general, participants found the research a positive 
experience and did not regret taking part.  
While such conversations started to lead to increased referrals to the study, 
some clinicians continued to express reservations. While understandably driven by 
their care for their client’s wellbeing, their views were heavily guided by their 
intuitive understanding and own clinical practice, rather than being guided by the 
developing evidence base. Such reluctance to be guided in clinical practice by the 
evidence base, has been highlighted as one mechanism which accounts for the 
difficulties with translating research into clinical practice (Baker, McFall, & Shoham, 
2008). This may be one hypothesis for understanding why the research base in the 
area of psychosis and intrusive trauma memories has not advanced to the same 
degree as in other disorders, where individuals may not be viewed as ‘vulnerable’ 
and ‘risky’ to the same degree.  In particular, it may highlight the emotiveness of the 
issues of trauma in psychosis in society.  
 
3. Professional development  
Prior to starting my doctorate in clinical psychology, my clinical and research 
experience had been working on psychiatric intensive care units and in inpatient 
services. I was initially drawn towards these posts, due to my interest in supporting 
people with severe and enduring mental health difficulties, with a specific interest in 
psychosis. At the beginning of my career in these posts, I was struck by the high 
rates of trauma, and I continued to see this pattern of complex trauma histories 
emerge across a range of psychological presentations throughout my varied clinical 
  
  118 
  
placements. Upon embarking on the process of this research, my reading highlighted 
for me the spectrum of responses to traumatic events. Such new understandings and 
knowledge fuelled my interest in working more specifically within a specialist post-
traumatic stress disorder service, in order to develop my clinical skills in the 
evidence base for working with intrusive trauma memories, given my increased 
awareness of the prevalence of symptoms associated with trauma.  
The research process continues to shape my thinking in all stages of my direct 
clinical work, from highlighting the importance of exploring trauma experiences in 
assessment, the phenomenology of related symptoms and the predominant place in 
psychological formulations. As I advanced along my training course, I started to be 
more mindful of considering the organisation and service structures in which I was 
working, and to consider the impact of these on my clients. Holding in mind the 
spectrum of responses to trauma, I became interested in service structuring. There is 
a move for some services to divide their service lines by diagnosis, creating a split 
between the teams supporting people with a psychosis presentation and those with a 
post-traumatic stress disorder presentation. Whilst this allows for the specialist 
provisions of skilled clinicians into the different services, it causes a separation in the 
understanding of a presentation which may be more helpfully viewed on a spectrum 
(Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003). My more in-depth conceptual understanding of 
trauma responses, as a consequence of the research process, has allowed me to take 
part in discussion around these challenges with the clinical team I am working with.  
 Conducting this research study has allowed me to have a clearer 
understanding about the clinical field I hope to work in upon completing my doctoral 
in clinical psychology, pursuing my interest to specialise in working with complex 
trauma. 
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4. Conclusions 
In conclusion, the research process demonstrated the complexities of the 
methodological choices to be considered when conducting research in a novel area, 
and the different organisational barriers when conducting research investigating 
trauma memories in psychosis. The research process also offered an opportunity to 
develop my clinical interests and shape my clinical practice.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  120 
  
References 
Albus, M., Hubmann, W., Mohr, F., Hecht, S., Hinterberger-Weber, P., Seitz, N.N., 
& Küchenhoff, H. (2006). Neurocognitive functioning in patients with first-
episode schizophrenia: Results of a prospective 5-year follow-up study. 
European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 256, 442. 
Aleman, A., Hijman, R., de Haan, E.H.F., & Kahn, R.S. (1999). Memory Impairment 
in Schizophrenia: A Meta-Analysis. American Journal of Psychiatry, 156, 
1358–1366. 
Baker, T.B., McFall, R.M., & Shoham, V. (2008). Current Status and Future 
Prospects of Clinical Psychology: Toward a Scientifically Principled 
Approach to Mental and Behavioral Health Care. Psychological Science 
Public Interest, 9(2), 67-103. 
Bell, J. (1993). Doing your research project. A guide to first time researchers in 
education and social sciences (2nd Ed.). Buckingham: Open University Press.  
Berna, F., Potheegadoo, J., Aouadi, I., Ricarte, J.J., Allé, M.C., Coutelle, R., Boyer, 
L., Cuervo-Lombard, C.V., & Danion, J.M. (2016). A Meta-Analysis of 
Autobiographical Memory Studies in Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorder. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 42(1), 56-66. 
Brewin, C.R. (2015). Re-experiencing traumatic events in PTSD: new avenues in 
research on intrusive memories and ﬂashbacks. European Journal of 
Psychotraumatology, 6, 27180. 
Burlingame, G.M., Seaman, S., Johnson, J.E., Whipple, J., Richardson, E., Rees, F., 
Earnshaw, D., Spencer, R., Payne, M., & O'Neil, B. (2006).  Sensitivity to 
change of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale-Extended (BPRS-E): An item 
and subscale analysis. Psychological Services, 3(2), 77-87. 
  
  121 
  
Carr, S.C. (2006). Developing a brief trauma screening tool for use in psychosis. 
Unpublished clinical psychology doctoral thesis, Department of Clinical, 
Educational, and Health Psychology. University College London. 
DeVylder, J.E., & Hilimire, M.R. (2015). Screening for psychotic experiences: social 
desirability biases in a non-clinical sample. Early Intervention Psychiatry, 
9(4), 331–334. 
Ebner-Priemer, U. W., & Trull, T. J. (2009). Ambulatory assessment—An innovative 
and promising approach for clinical psychology. European Psychologist, 14, 
109 –119. 
Eisenacher, S., Rausch, F., Ainser, F., Mier, D., Veckenstedt, R., Schirmbeck, F., 
Lewien, A., Englisch, S., Andreou, C., Moritz, S., Meyer-Lindenberg, A., 
Kirsch, P., & Zink, M. (2015). Investigation of metamemory functioning in 
the at-risk mental state for psychosis. Psychological Medicine, 45(15), 3329-
3340. 
Fioravanti, M., Carlone, O., Vitale, B., Cinti, M.E., & Clare, L. (2005). A meta-
analysis of cognitive deficits in adults with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Neuropsychological Review, 15, 73– 95. 
Grubaugh, A.L., Zinzow H.M., Paul, L., Egede, L.E. & Frueh, C. (2011). Trauma 
exposure and posttraumatic stress disorder in adults with severe mental 
illness: A critical review. Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 883-899. 
Health and Social Care Information Centre (2015b). Mental health bulletin. Annual 
report from MHMDS Returns 2013-14. Available at: 
www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB18808 (accessed on 12th May 2016). 
Heinrichs, R. W., & Zarkanis, K.K. (1998). Neurocognitive deficit in schizophrenia: 
A quantitative review of the evidence. Neuropsychology, 12, 426–445. 
  
  122 
  
Holmes, E. A., & Steel, C. (2004). Schizotypy: A Vulnerability Factor for Traumatic 
Intrusions. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 192(1), 28-34. 
Jaffe, A.E., DiLillo, D., Hoffman, L., Haikalis, M., Dykstra, R.E. (2015) Does it hurt 
to ask? A meta-analysis of participant reactions to trauma research. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 40, 40-56. 
Kahneman, D., Fredrickson, B., Schreiber, C.A., Redelmeier, D.A. (1993). When 
More Pain Is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End. Psychological Science, 
4(6), 401–405. 
Khan, S., & Brabham, A. (2015). ‘Preparing to implement the new access and 
waiting time standards for early intervention in psychosis’. Presentation at the 
North East and Cumbria and Yorkshire and Humber EIP and IAPT 
Workshop, Leeds, 7 May. Available at: http://www.nescn.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Joint-North-Regional-Mental-Health-Event-
Presentation-Final.pdf (accessed on 12th May 2016). 
Konings, M., Bak, M., Hanssen, M., Van Os, J., & Krabbendam, L. (2006). Validity 
and reliability of the CAPE: A self‐report instrument for the measurement of 
psychotic experiences in the general population. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 114(1), 55-61. 
Lester, H., & Wilson, S. (1999).  Practical problems in recruiting patients with 
schizophrenia into randomised controlled trials. British Medical Journal, 318, 
1075. 
Lukoff, D., Liberman, R.P., & Nuechterlein, K.H. (1986a). Symptom monitoring in 
the rehabilitation of schizophrenic patients. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 12, 578–
593. 
  
  123 
  
Marks, E. M., Steel, C., & Peters, E. R. (2012). Intrusions in trauma and psychosis: 
information processing and phenomenology. Psychological Medicine, 42(11), 
2313-2323. 
Miller, F.G., Rosenstein, D.L., & DeRenzo, E.G. (1998). Professional integrity in 
clinical research. JAMA, 280, 1449-1454. 
Moritz, S., Woodward, T.S., & Hausmann, D. (2006a). Incautious reasoning as a 
pathogenetic factor for the development of psychotic symptoms in 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, 327–331. 
Moritz, S., Woodward, T.S., & Ruff, C. (2003). Source monitoring and memory 
confidence in schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 33, 131–139. 
Morrison, A.P., Frame, L., & Larkin, W., (2003). Relationships between trauma and 
psychosis: A review and integration. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
42, 331–353. 
Patel, M.X., Doku, V., & Tennakoon, L. (2003), Challenges in recruitment of 
research participants. Journal of Continuing Professional Development, 9, 
229-238. 
Paulsen, J.S., Heaton, R.K., Sadek, J.R., Perry, W., Delis, D.C., Braff, D., Kuck, J., 
Zisook, S., & Jeste, D.V. (1995). The nature of learning and memory 
impairments in schizophrenia. Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society, 1(1), 88-99. 
Priebe, K., Kleindienst, N., Zimmer, J., Koudela, S., Ebner-Priemer, U., & Bohus, M. 
(2013). Frequency of intrusions and flashbacks in patients with posttraumatic 
stress disorder related to childhood sexual abuse: an electronic diary study. 
Psychological Assessment, 25(4), 1370-1376 . 
  
  124 
  
Rethink Mental Illness (2014). Lost generation: why young people with psychosis 
are being left behind, and what needs to change. London: Rethink Mental 
Illness. Available at: www.rethink.org/living-with-mental-illness/early-
intervention (accessed on 25th May 2016). 
Reynolds, M., & Brewin, C.R. (1999). Intrusive memories in depression and 
posttraumatic stress disorder. Behavioural research therapy, 37(3), 201-15. 
The King’s Fund, The Health Foundation (2015). Mental Health Under Pressure. 
London: The Health Foundation. Available at: 
www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/.../mental-health-under-pressure-
nov15_0.pdf (accessed on 25th May 2016). 
Varese, F., Smeets, F., Drukker, M., Lieverse, R., Lataster, T., Viechtbauer, W., 
Read, J., van Os, J., & Bentall, R.P. (2012). Childhood Adversities Increase 
the Risk of Psychosis: A Meta-analysis of Patient-Control, Prospective- and 
Cross-sectional Cohort Studies. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 38(4), 661-671. 
Woodall, A., Howard L., & Morgan C. (2011). Barriers to participation in mental 
health research: findings from the Genetics and Psychosis (GAP) Study. 
International Review of Psychiatry, 23(1), 31-40. 
Young, C. L., & Dombrowski, M. (1989) Psychosocial influences on research 
subject recruitment, enrolment and retention. Social Work in Health Care, 14, 
43–57. 
 
  
  125 
  
Appendices 
Appendix A 
Ethical approval by London Queens Square Research Ethics Committee  
 
  
  126 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  127 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  128 
  
Appendix B 
Approval from NELFT Research and Development Office   
 
  
  129 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
  130 
  
Appendix C 
Approval from NOCLOR Research Support of behalf of ELFT 
 
 
  
  131 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  132 
  
Appendix D 
Clinical Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
  
  133 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  134 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  135 
  
Appendix E 
Clinical Participant Consent Form 
 
 
  
  136 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  137 
  
Appendix F 
Semi-structured Interview of Intrusive Trauma Memories 
 
Memory Assessment Interview 
 
“In your answers to the questionnaires you said that memories of (a trauma – or use 
participants own words) pop into your mind or come out of the blue, when you do not want 
them. I would like to ask you some questions about what these memories are like for you. 
Knowing more about these experiences will help us to improve future treatment.  
 
Please let me know if you feel upset at any point, you would like to take a break or stop at 
any time, or you have any questions. If you are unsure about what I am asking, please let 
me know so I can explain things better. Do you have any questions?” 
 
Part A - Narrative of an intrusive trauma memory  
 
A1. “You have told us that memories of (__________________) (specify participants trauma 
reported in the questionnaire) pop into your mind or come out of the blue when you do not 
want them to. Please select the intrusive memory that bothers you the most. (If a 
participant experiences more than one intrusion, then ask them to select the most 
distressing.)  
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A2. “It would be helpful if you had a clear picture of this intrusive memory while we talk 
about it. Could you try to bring an image of _______________ (specify) into your mind 
now? If you feel comfortable, it may be easier to close your eyes to do this. I’ll give you some 
time to try to remember it. (Pause for 30 seconds). “Have you got it now? Can you describe 
the intrusive memory to me from beginning to end in detail for me? Please describe it in as 
much detail as possible so that a film director might be able to recreate the scene. (Follow 
up prompts if needed)  
Can you tell me a bit more about how you experience this memory?  
What is it like? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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A3. “In the intrusive memory, what do you see, hear, feel, smell and/or taste”?”  (If 
participant reports sensory experiences, explore all the sensory modalities, taste, smell, 
visual, auditory, tactile, bodily sensations) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
A4. “Do you have strong physical sensations in the intrusive memory such as heart racing, 
sweating, trembling, nausea, headache, chills/flushes, and ‘butterflies in the stomach?”  
 
No physical sensations 
Physical sensations present 
 
 
A5. “In the intrusive memory, what emotions or feelings do you have?” 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Tick emotions reported in box below.  Prompt for additional emotions using checklist.   
 
Sad   Guilty   Ashamed         Disgust                                                                
 
Angry   Anxious  Helpless  Fear 
 
Humiliated  Powerless   
 
 
 
A6. “In the intrusive memory, what are you thinking?” Further prompt: “What are you 
thinking about yourself, other people, and the situation?”   
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
If the participant’s eyes are close, direct them to open their eyes and bring their attention 
back to the room, using grounding if needed. Summarise their description in detail, 
including emotions experiences, adding “Is that right?”  Thank participant for sharing their 
description, validate emotional response, and check if they are o.k. to proceed. 
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Part B - Characteristics of memory intrusions 
 
“I’d now like to ask you some more questions about this intrusive memory” 
 
 
B1. “Approximately how often has the intrusive memory that bothers you the most occurred 
in the past two weeks?” 
 
Once a week or less 
Several times a week 
Once a day 
Several times a day or more 
 
 
B2. “When you experience this intrusive memory, how long does it last?” 
 
Seconds 
Minutes 
Up to an hour 
Several hours 
Constantly preoccupied 
 
 
 
B3. “How long has it been since the event featuring in the intrusive memory?” 
 
Less than 1 year ago  
1–5 years ago  
More than 5 years ago 
 
 
 
B4. “How distressing is the intrusive memory on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means not 
distressing at all and 10 extremely distressing?” 
 
      No           Extreme 
   distress           distress 
     0     1          2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
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B5. “Vividness means how clear and distinct the image appears; how similar it is to seeing 
something in the environment. When something is not vivid it may appear hazy or unclear. 
Holding in mind your most frequent intrusive memory, how clear and vivid was the 
memory?”  
 
Unclear/hazy 
Some detail  
Vivid 
Very vivid – like it was happening in the here and now 
 
 
 
B6. “When the intrusive memory came into you mind, do you feel as if you are reliving the 
memory, as if it is happening again now or experiencing the memory as having happened in 
the past?”  
 
 
Reliving the                                                                                                                        Looking back 
 experience                                                                                                                           at the past  
       0                            1                            2                            3                           4                           5   
 
 
 
B7. “Holding in mind your most frequent intrusive memory, how much does your intrusive 
memory exist of loosely related pieces or images, where 0= a coherent image and 10=lots of 
loosely related images?” 
 
A coherent         Lots of loosely 
Image                                                                                                                        related images                                                                                                            
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7    8             9  10  
 
 
 
 
B8. “Are your intrusive memories in any way unclear or jumbled? On a 4 point scale where 0 
is not at all and 3 is a lot/very much, how unclear or jumbled are your intrusive memories?” 
 
                   Not at all                                                                   Very much 
0  1  2  3   
 
 
 
B9. “An out of body experience typically involves a sensation of floating outside your own 
body and, in some cases, perceiving your body from a place outside one's body. Was the 
intrusive memory accompanied by an out of body experience?” 
 
Experience absent  
Experience present 
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B10. “Memories can differ in how they appear to us, in what view they are from.” 
 
“Field perspective is when you are able to see memories as if looking out from your own 
eyes, observing what is going on around you.” The researcher shows a photograph to 
demonstrate.  
 
“Observer perspective is when the memory appears as if you can see an image of yourself 
in the scene being observed from someone else’s point of view”. The researcher shows a 
photograph to demonstrate.  
 
“Memories can also switch between these two perspectives.” “Thinking about the memory 
we just discussed, do you mostly view the situation as if you are looking out through your 
eyes, or one in which you are looking at yourself from outside of yourself? Or does it switch 
between the two views?”  
 
-3 = Field       0 = Alternating       +3 = Observer 
 
 
 
 
B11. “When this intrusive memory pops into your mind or comes out of the blue, how much 
do you feel you have control over stopping this memory?  
 
                   Not at all                                                                   Very much 
0  1  2  3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part C – Intentional Recall of Memory                                                                                        
 
Thank you for telling me about your intrusions of (trauma/event).  I would now like to ask 
you about what the memory of (trauma/event) is like if you deliberately, or intentionally, 
remember about what happened.   
 
 
C1. “Have you intentionally/deliberately remembered or thought what happened in the past 
month?”   
 
No             (Discontinue part C) 
 
Yes 
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C2. If yes, “When you intentionally or deliberately approximately how often have you 
thought about it in the past week?” 
 
Once a week or less 
Several times a week 
Once a day 
Several times a day or more 
 
 
C3. “When you intentionally or deliberately think about what happened, how long does it 
last?” 
 
Seconds 
Minutes 
Up to an hour 
Several hours 
Constantly preoccupied 
 
 
C4. “How distressing was the memory on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means not distressing 
at all and 10 extremely distressing?” 
 
      No           Extreme 
   distress           distress 
     0     1          2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
 
 
 
C5. “Vividness means how clear and distinct the memory appears; how similar it is to seeing 
something in the environment. When something is not vivid it may appear hazy or unclear. 
Holding in mind what the memory is like when you try to remember it, how clear and vivid is 
the memory?”  
 
Unclear/hazy 
Some detail  
Vivid 
Very vivid – like it was happening in the here and now 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  143 
  
C6. “Did strong physical sensations accompany the memory such as heart racing, sweating, 
trembling, nausea, headache, chills/flushes, and ‘butterflies in the stomach?”  
 
No physical sensations 
Physical sensations present 
 
 
C7. “When you deliberately remember what happened, do you feel as if you are reliving the 
memory, as if it is happening again now or experiencing the memory as having happened in 
the past?” 
  
Reliving the                                                                                                                        Looking back 
 experience                                                                                                                           at the past 
       0                            1                            2                            3                           4                           5   
 
 
 
C8. “Holding in mind what it’s like when you deliberately/intentionally remember what 
happened, how much does your memory exist of loosely related pieces or images, where 0= 
a coherent image and 10=lots of loosely related images?” 
 
A coherent         Lots of loosely 
Image                                                                                                                        related images                                                                                                            
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7    8             9  10  
 
 
 
 
C9. “Are your memories in any way unclear or jumbled? On a 4 point scale where 0 is not at 
all and 3 is a lot/very much, how unclear or jumbled are your memories?” 
 
                   Not at all                                                                   Very much 
0  1  2  3   
 
 
C10. “Memories can differ in how they appear to us, in what view they are from.” 
 
“Field perspective is when you are able to see memories as if looking out from your own 
eyes, observing what is going on around you.” The researcher shows a photograph to 
demonstrate.  
 
“Observer perspective is when the memory appears as if you can see an image of yourself 
in the scene being observed from someone else’s point of view”. The researcher shows a 
photograph to demonstrate.  
 
“Memories can also switch between these two perspectives.” “Thinking about the memory 
we just discussed, do you mostly view the situation as if you are looking out through your 
eyes, or one in which you are looking at yourself from outside of yourself? Or does it switch 
between the two views?”  
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-3 = Field       0 = Alternating       +3 = Observer 
 
 
C11.  “Sometimes memories can change over time. Do you think this may have happened 
with your memory?  On a 4 point scale where 0 is not at all and 3 is a lot/very much, how 
much, it at all, do you think your memory may have changed?” 
 
 
                   Not at all                                                                   Very much 
0  1  2  3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
C12. “How much control do you think you have when you think about (trauma/event)?   
 
                   Not at all                                                                   Very much 
0  1  2  3   
 
 
 
 
 
“Is there anything important about the intrusive memory or the memories you 
intentionally/deliberate think about that you haven’t had the opportunity to talk about?” 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix G 
Objective Fragmentation Coding Frame 
 
Objective ratings of memory fragmentation was measured by using the coding 
manual developed by Foa et al (1995) to analyse the voluntary narrative of a trauma 
memory narrated by a person with PTSD.  
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Appendix H 
Joint Project Declaration 
 
This thesis is part of a joint trainee project with Sarah Carr.  This thesis investigated 
the phenomenology of intrusive trauma memories in psychosis, and Sarah’s study 
focused on developing a trauma screening questionnaire for use within the psychosis 
population. Ethical approval, recruitment and data collection was shared between 
myself and Sarah, but individual project research questions and hypotheses were 
developed. Data analysis and interpretation were also conducted independently.    
 
Carr, S.C. (2006). Developing a brief trauma screening tool for use in psychosis. 
Unpublished clinical psychology doctoral thesis, Department of Clinical, 
Educational, and Health Psychology. University College London. 
 
